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Abstract
This paper studies policy in a class of economies in which information about commonly-
relevant fundamentals—such as aggregate productivity and demand conditions—is dispersed
and can not be centralized by the government. In these economies, the decentralized use of
information can fail to be efficient either because of discrepancies between private and social
payoffs, or because of informational externalities. In the first case, inefficiency manifests itself in
excessive non-fundamental volatility (overreaction to common noise) or excessive cross-sectional
dispersion (overreaction to idiosyncratic noise). In the second case, inefficiency manifests itself
in suboptimal social learning (low quality of information contained in macroeconomic data,
financial prices, and other indicators of economic activity). In either case, a novel role for policy
is identified: the government can improve welfare by manipulating the incentives agents face
when deciding how to use their available sources of information. Our key result is that this can
be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of marginal taxes on aggregate activity.
This contingency permits the government to control the reaction of equilibrium to different
types of noise, to improve the quality of information in prices and macro data, and, in overall,
to restore efficiency in the decentralized use of information.
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"The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined pre-
cisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use
never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incom-
plete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.
The economic problem of society is ... a problem of the utilization of knowledge which
is not given to anyone in its totality. " (Friedreich A. Hayek, 1945)
1 Introduction
The dispersion of information is an essential part of the economic problem faced by society. This
concerns not only the idiosyncratic needs and means of different households and firms, but also
commonly-relevant fundamentals. For example, think of the business cycle. Information about
aggregate productivity and demand conditions is crucial for individual consumption, production,
and pricing decisions. Yet, such information is widely dispersed and it is only imperfectly aggregated
through markets, the media, or other channels of communication in society.
As emphasized by Hayek (1945), such information can not be centralized within a single in-
stitution, such as the government. Instead, society must rely on decentralized mechanisms for
the utilization of such information. One can then be assured that rational agents will always use
their available information in the most privately-efficient way. This, however, need not coincide with
what best serves social interests. For example, complementarities in investment or pricing decisions
may induce firms to overreact to public information, because public information helps forecast the
decisions of others; this can crowd out valuable private information and can also amplify the impact
of common noise, resulting in higher non-fundamental volatility. Furthermore, individuals may fail
to internalize how their own choices affect the information contained in financial prices or other
indicators of aggregate activity; this can lead to inefficient social learning about the underlying
economic fundamentals.
A novel role for policy then emerges: even if the government cannot centralize the information
that is dispersed in society and can not otherwise collect and communicate information, there
may exist policies that improve efficiency in the decentralized use of information by appropriately
manipulating the incentives faced by individual agents. Identifying such policies is the objective
of this paper. Our key result is to show how efficiency is achieved by appropriately designing the
contingency of marginal taxes on realized aggregate activity.
Preview. Rather than focusing on a specific application, we seek to highlight a more general
policy lesson. We thus conduct our analysis within an abstract, but tractable, class of games that
allow for two sources of inefficiency in the decentralized use of information: payoff externalities and
informational externalities. The former are short-cuts for a variety of strategic and other exter-
nal effects featured in applications, such as those originating in production spillovers, investment
or pricing complementarities, monopoly power, social networking, and the like; they summarize
potential discrepancies between private and social payoffs. The latter reflect the (imperfect) aggre-
gation of information obtained through financial prices, the publication of data on macroeconomic
activity, or other forms of social learning.
Our analysis then proceeds in two steps. First, we compare the equilibrium in the absence
of policy intervention with the allocation that maximizes welfare subject to the sole constraint
that information can not be directly transferred from one agent to another; this helps detect the
potential inefficiencies in the decentralized use of information. Next, we identify tax schemes that
implement the efficient strategy as an equilibrium; this gives the key policy result of the paper.
The symptoms of inefficiency that we detect by comparing the equilibrium strategy with the
aforementioned socially optimal strategy depend on whether the inefficiency originates in pay-
off or informational externalities. In the first case, inefficiency manifests itself in excessive non-
fundamental volatility (overreaction to common noise) or excessive cross-sectional dispersion (over-
reaction to idiosyncratic noise). In the second case, inefficiency manifests itself in suboptimal
social learning (too much noise in macroeconomic indicators, financial prices, or other channels of
information aggregation)
.
Yet, the same,policy prescription works for either case, as well as for economies that combine
the two sources of inefficiency. Our key result is that the government can control how agents
use different sources of information in equilibrium by making the marginal tax rate contingent
on aggregate activity. An appropriate design of the tax system then restores efficiency in the
decentralized use of information, irrespective of the specific source of inefficiency.
The logic behind this result is simple. When individuals expect marginal taxes to decrease
with realized aggregate activity, they also expect the realized net-of-taxes return on their own
activity to increase with aggregate activity. It follows that a negative dependence of marginal
taxes on aggregate activity imputes strategic complementarity in individual choices: agents have
an incentive to align their choices with those of others. Symmetrically, a positive dependence
imputes strategic substitutability: agents have an incentive to differentiate their choices.
Next note that a better alignment of individual decisions obtains when agents rely more on
common sources of information, whereas more differentiation obtains when agents rely more on
idiosyncratic sources of information. It follows that the government can use the contingency of
marginal taxes on aggregate activity to fashion how agents respond to different sources of infor-
mation. In particular, when marginal taxes decrease with aggregate activity, by inducing strategic
complementarity the policy also induces higher relative sensitivity of equilibrium actions to com-
mon information. Symmetrically, when marginal taxes increase with aggregate activity, by inducing
strategic substitutability the policy also induces higher relative sensitivity to idiosyncratic infor-
mation.
It follows that, by appropriately designing the aforementioned contingency, the government can
control how agents use their available information. In so doing, the government can control, not
only the impact of noise on equilibrium activity, but also the quality of information contained in
prices and macroeconomic data. The government can thereby improve welfare even without itself
centralizing or communicating information to the market.
Discussion. It is often argued that financial markets overreact to public news, causing ineffi-
cient fluctuations in both asset prices and real investment. This idea goes back at least to Keynes
(1936), who argued that professional investors, instead of focusing on the long-run fundamental
value of the assets, try to second-guess the demands of one another, thus causing inefficient fluc-
tuations in asset prices and investment. 1 In this paper, although we are partly motivated by the
broader theme that markets may react inefficiently to available information, we do not limit atten-
tion to any specific application, nor do we examine the deeper origins of such inefficiency (which,
unavoidably, will be specific to the application of interest). Rather, our goal is to identify policy
remedies that need not be sensitive to the details of the origin of the inefficiency. This explains
our choice to work with a theoretical framework that is abstract and flexible enough to allow for a
variety of distortions in the decentralized use of information.
Our analysis also takes as exogenous the limits society faces in aggregating dispersed informa-
tion. Investigating the foundations for these limits, and their potential implications for policy and
institutional design, is a challenging topic beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, our analysis
offers some relevant insights. In our class of economies, equilibrium welfare may decrease with addi-
tional information because of possible inefficiencies in the equilibrium use of information. However,
once these inefficiencies have been removed, more information can only improve welfare. Therefore,
policies that provide the market with the right incentives for how to use available information also
complement policies, or other institutions, that provide the market with more information.
Furthermore, while our analysis focuses on how the contingency of taxes on aggregate activity
can improve the decentralized use of information, in practice, the contingency of monetary policy
on aggregate activity might also help in the same direction. Indeed, the more general insight that
comes out of our analysis is how the anticipation of such contingencies affects the incentives agents
face in using their available information, and how this in turn affects efficiency.
Methodological remarks. The policy exercise conducted in this paper strikes a balance
between two dominant paradigms: the Ramsey tradition to optimal policy (e.g., Barro, 1979,
Lucas and Stokey, 1983, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1994); and the Mirrlees tradition, or the
"new public finance" paradigm (e.g., Kocherlakota, 2005; Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning, 2006).
We deviate from the Ramsey tradition by introducing heterogeneous information and by avoiding
xThis point was epitomized in Keynes' famous beauty-contest metaphor for financial markets, which highlighted
the potential role of higher-order expectations. Elements of this role have recently been formalized in Allen, Morris
and Shin (2003), Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005), and Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2007).
ad hoc restrictions on the set of available policy instruments. In this respect, our policy exercise
is closer to the new public finance literature. At the same time, we deviate from the Mirrlees
tradition by abstracting from redistributive taxation (or social insurance) and focusing instead on
policies that correct inefficiencies in the response of equilibrium outcomes to aggregate shocks. In
this respect, our policy exercise is closer to the Ramsey tradition.
Furthermore, the Mirrlees literature studies environments in which agents have private infor-
mation regarding purely idiosyncratic shocks, such as an agent's own tastes, talent, or labor pro-
ductivity; whenever aggregate shocks are featured in this literature, information regarding these
shocks is assumed to be common. In contrast, we study environments in which agents have dis-
persed information regarding aggregate shocks; these shocks could be about either the underlying
fundamentals or the distribution of information in society. The key difference then is that the
absence of common knowledge regarding these shocks generates strategic uncertainty: agents face
uncertainty regarding aggregate activity. It is precisely this uncertainty that makes the contingency
of taxes on aggregate activity essential for restoring efficiency—which also explains why the results
presented here are, to the best of our knowledge, completely novel to the policy literature.
Finally, note that the policies we identify resemble Pigou-like taxes in the sense that they
make agents internalize externalities. However, they are different with regard to both the nature of
the underlying distortion and the way they restore efficiency. In standard Pigou-like contexts, the
market produces/consumes too much or too little of a certain commodity. The Pigou remedy is
then to impose a tax or subsidy on this commodity. In our context, instead, the market reacts too
much or too little to certain sources of information. The analogue of the Pigou remedy would then
consist in imposing a tax or subsidy directly on the use of these sources of information. However,
this seems practically impossible. Our contribution is to show how the same goal can be achieved
indirectly by appropriately designing the contingency of taxes on aggregate activity.
Other related literature. The literature that studies dispersed information in macroeco-
nomic contexts goes back to Phelps (1970), Lucas (1972), Townsend (1983), and the rational-
expectations revolution of the 70's and early 80's. More recently, Mankiw and Reis (2000) and
Woodford (2001) have raised interest on the business cycle implications of combining information
heterogeneity with strategic complementarity in pricing decisions. 2 We complement this line of
work by studying policy in environments that share this key combination.
Another line of work, following Morris and Shin (2002), has examined whether welfare increases
with more precise public information within specific models. 3 Some of these papers have found a
negative result, which has then been used to make a case against central-bank transparency; others
have found the opposite result. In Angeletos and Pavan (2007) we showed how these apparently
2See also Amato and Shin (2006), Hellwig (2005), Lorenzoni (2006), and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2006).
3See also Amador and Weil (2007), Angeletos and Pavan (2004), Baeriswyl and Conrand (2007), Heinemann and
Cornand (2006), Hellwig (2005), Roca (2006), and Svensson (2005).
conflicting results can be explained by understanding the underlying inefficiencies in the equilib-
rium use of information. For that purpose, we considered an abstract framework that restricted
information to be exogenous but was flexible enough to nest most of the applications examined
in the literature; we then used this framework to study the social value of information (i.e., the
comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure). In the first
part of the present paper, we use a generalized version of that framework for a different purpose:
to study how efficiency in the decentralized use of information can be restored through an appro-
priately designed tax system. In the second part of the paper, we extend the analysis to dynamic
environments in which information is partially endogenous; we then show how similar policies also
correct inefficiencies that originate from informational externalities.
In this last respect, our analysis complements that in Vives (1993, 1997) and Amador and
Weill (2007). These papers study the speed of social learning and the social value of information
in a dynamic economy where agents learn from noisy observations of past aggregate activity. Our
results identify policies that can control the speed of social learning and also guarantee that any
exogenous information is socially valuable.
Layout. Section 2 introduces the baseline framework. Section 3 studies inefficiencies in the
decentralized use of information due to payoff externalities. Section 4 identifies tax systems that
remove such inefficiencies. Section 5 extends the analysis to dynamic settings and Section 6 to
settings with informational externalities. Section 7 discusses implications for the social value of
information. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The baseline static framework
In this section we outline our baseline framework: a game that abstracts from the institutional
details of any specific application but is flexible enough to capture the role of strategic interactions,
external payoff effects, and dispersed information in a variety of applications.
Actions and payoffs. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents of measure one,
indexed by i £ [0,1], each choosing an action ki £ E. In addition, there is a government, which
imposes a tax T{ £ K on each agent i, subject to the constraint that the budget is balanced.
Let tp denote the cumulative distribution function of individual actions in the cross-section of
the population and let K = f hdip(k) and Ok = [J (k — K) 2dtp(k)] 1
'2 denote, respectively, the mean
and the dispersion of individual actions. The (reduced-form) payoff of agent i is given by
Ui = U(ki,K,ak ,8i) -n, (1)
for some U : M 2 x M+ x G —> R. The variable 9{ £ C R represents a shock to agent i's payoff.
For concreteness, in what follows we often think of fcj as "investment" and 64 as a "productivity
shock." The external and strategic effects exhibited in U may originate, not only from preferences
and technologies, but also from pecuniary externalities, monopoly power, oligopolistic competition,
social networks, and the like. What is crucial, though, is that payoffs can be reduced to the
specification assumed above without missing any channels of endogenous information aggregation;
the analysis of the latter is postponed to Section 6. Finally note that, by assuming linearity of
payoffs in transfers, we are ruling out any redistributive (or insurance) role for taxation.
Payoff restrictions. To maintain tractability, we assume that U is a concave quadratic poly-
nomial and that the external effect of dispersion depends only on its own level (i.e., Ua {k, K, o^-, 0) —
Uaa (Tk- f°r an (k, K, crfc, 5)). 4 To guarantee existence and uniqueness of both the equilibrium and the
efficient allocation, we assume the following: Ukk < 0, which imposes concavity at the individual's
decision problem; —Ukn/Ukk < 1> which ensures that the slope of the individual's best response
with respect to aggregate activity is less than one; and Ukk + 2UkK + Ukk < and Ukk + Uaa < 0,
which imposes concavity at the planner's problem. 5
Timing and information. There are three stages. In stage 1, the government announces a
policy rule T that specifies how taxes will be collected in stage 3 as a function of information that
will be public at that stage. 6 In stage 2, agents simultaneously choose their actions under dispersed
information (described below). Finally, in stage 3, actions and aggregate productivity are publicly
revealed, taxes are paid, payoffs are realized, and the game ends. 7
The information structure is as follows. Let W; e Q denote the information (also the "type") of
agent i. Next, let f £ F denote a joint distribution for (#j,w;), with marginal distributions for 9i
and oji given by h 6 H and (f> e $, respectively. The distribution / describes the joint distribution
of (0,u>) in the cross-section of the population; we refer to / as the "state of the world." 8 First,
Nature draws / from a set of possible distributions F according to the probability measure T which
is common knowledge among the agents. Nature then uses / to draw a pair (9i,Ui) for each agent
i, with the pairs [6i,Ui)i£[o,i] drawn independently from /. Each agent i then observes his own u>j,
but does not observe either Q{ or the distribution /. Note, though, that w, encodes information, not
only about the agent's own productivity #j, but also about the distribution / of productivities and
information in the population.
Although most of the analysis does not require any restriction on the information structure,
4The external effect of dispersion is relevant for certain applications: in new-keynesian models, e.g., dispersion in
relative prices has a negative welfare effect.
5Although the restriction
—Uki</Ukk < 1 is necessary for the equilibrium to be unique in the absence of government
intervention, our main policy result does not rely on this restriction: the policies identified in Section 4 implement
the efficient allocation as the unique equilibrium even in economies that feature multiple equilibria in the absence of
policy intervention.
6 Because the government has no private information, the announcement of T does not convey any information
about the fundamentals; its only role is to affect the agents' incentives.
7Throughout, we do not require idiosyncratic productivities to be revealed at stage 3. Also, in Section 4.3 we
consider an extension that adds noise to the observation of actions and aggregate productivity at stage 3.
sThis is with a slight abuse of terminology because / does not describe the specific (8i,uJi) for each single agent.
we find it useful to impose a certain "regularity" condition. Fix an information structure (Cl,F,F)
and consider any two payoff structures, U x and U 2 . Let A; 1 : Cl —* R be an equilibrium strategy
for the economy £ l = (C/ 1 ; S7, i^1, JF) and k 2 : Cl —> R an equilibrium strategy for the economy
S 2 — (U2 ;Cl,F,!F). We say that the information structure (Cl, F, F) is "regular" if and only if,
whenever Ule/Ukk ^ Uke/Ukk or UkK/Ukk ^ U2K/Ukk , there exists a positive-measure set CI C CI
such that k l (u)) 7^ k2 (u) for any w 6 fi. This restriction can be fully appreciated (in terms of
primitives of the environment) only once we characterize the equilibrium. However it has a simple
economic meaning: it requires that different sensitivities of individual best responses to either the
fundamentals or others' activity result to different equilibrium actions for a positive measure of
types. The role of this condition is to rule out trivial cases in which changes in incentives do not
lead to any change in the use of information. 9
To illustrate the type of shocks and information structures that we allow, consider the following
Gaussian example. Agent i's productivity is given by 9i — 9+Q, where 9 is an aggregate productivity
shock while 9 is an idiosyncratic productivity shock. The former is Normally distributed with mean
jjlq and variance a2
,; the latter is i.i.d. across agents and independent of 9, Normally distributed
with zero mean and variance a2 . Each agent's information u>{ consists of a private signal Xi — #i + £j
about own productivity and a public signal y = 9 + e about the average productivity in the market.
The variable £j is idiosyncratic noise, i.i.d. across agents, Normally distributed with zero mean
and variance a2
,
whereas the variable e is public noise, Normally distributed with zero mean and
variance a2 . The noises £; and e are independent of one another as well as of 9 and of q. In this
example, / is a distribution whose marginal h over 9i is Normal with mean 9 and variance a2e and
whose marginal
<f> over cjj = (xi,y) assigns measure one to y = 9 + e and is Normal in Xi with mean
9 and variance a2 + a2 . As it will become clear in Section 3, imposing the "regularity" condition
in this example is equivalent to imposing that the variances a2
,,
a2 and a2 are positive and finite.
Applications. The following examples are directly nested in our framework:
• Ui = Aiki — ^k 2 , with Ai — 9i 4- aK, K = / kidi, 9i = 9 + ?;, and < a < 1. This example
can be interpreted as a stylized version of models with production or network externalities:
the private return to investment (A) increases with aggregate investment (K) . The scalar a
then parametrizes the strength of the spillover effect, while 9 is a common productivity shock
and q is an idiosyncratic productivity shock.
• 7T- = 7T* - ^ - p*)
2
,
with p* = a9 + (1 - a) P, P = J prfi, a G (0, 1), and tt* G R. This
example captures the incomplete-information new-Keynesian business-cycle models of Wood-
ford (2002), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2006), Baeriswyl and Conrand (2007), and others:
firms suffer a loss whenever their price (pi) deviates from some target level (p*), which in turn
9As it will become clear in Sections 3 and 4, the only result that is affected if we relax this condition is the
uniqueness of the optimal policy (not its existence).
depends on the aggregate price level (P). In this context, 8 represents exogenous aggregate
nominal demand conditions, while 1 — a determines the degree of strategic complementarity
in pricing decisions (a.k.a. "real rigidities").
• TTi = {a + bOi + cK) ki - \kf, with K = / kidi, and (a, b, c) e R3 . This example nests the large
Cournot and Bertrand games studied in Vives (1984, 1998), Raith (1996), and various other
10 papers. In this context, 9i represents a common demand or cost shock, fcj. the quantity (for
Cournot) or the price (for Bertrand) set by firm i, and c the degree of strategic substitutability
(for Cournot) or complementarity (for Bertrand) among firms' decisions.
• m = - (1 — r) (ki — 6) - r{Li — L), with Li = J (kj — ki)
2
dj, L = J Lidi, and r G (0, 1).
This example is the beauty-contest game studied in Morris and Shin (2002), Svensson (2005)
and Heinemann and Cornand (2006): an agent faces a cost whenever the distance of his own
action from the actions of others (Li) is higher than the average distance in the population
(L). This game is supposed to capture, in a stylized fashion, Keynes' idea that financial
markets involve a zero-sum race between professional investors for who will second-guess the
demands of others.
More generally, as it will become clear in Section 3.2, our framework nests—at least as far as
equilibrium is concerned—any model in which the agents' interaction can be summarized in the
following best-response structure:
ki = Ei [A(9i ,e,K)]
for some linear function A. Clearly, the institutional details and deeper micro-foundations behind
this structure vary from one application to another. Nevertheless, by conducting our exercise within
an abstract framework that does not take any particular stand on these "details," the lessons we
will provide in the subsequent sections are likely to hold across all these applications.
Remarks. Because the primary goal of this paper is to study policies that improve welfare
without centralizing the information that is dispersed in the population, throughout the analysis
we restrict attention to tax systems that utilize only information that is in the public domain. In
so doing, we rule out direct mechanisms in which the agents send reports about their types to the
government and then the government collects taxes on the basis of such reports. As we will show
in Section 4, this is actually without any loss of optimality within our framework as long as the
government does not use such reports to transfer information from one agent to another before
individual actions have been committed.
Note, however, that this does not mean that we rule out all forms of aggregation and exchange of
information in society; it only means that the government is not itself a channel of communication.
Indeed, we could readily reinterpret some of the exogenous information as the result of certain
types of information aggregation; for example, some or all of the agents may observe a signal about
8
the underlying fundamentals that is the outcome of an opinion poll or the price of an unmodeled
financial market. What is crucial for the baseline analysis is that the information available to any
given agent does not depend on other agents' strategies, nor is it affected by government policies;
these alternative cases are considered in Sections 6 and 7.
Finally, note that, while our prior work on the social value of information (Angeletos and Pavan,
2007) and virtually all the related literature (Morris and Shin, 2002, etc.) have limited attention
to the case of perfectly correlated shocks and to a specific Gaussian information structure, here we
allow the shocks to be imperfectly correlated and we consider more general information structures.
This will permit us to highlight that our main policy results need not be sensitive to the specific
details of the information structure. Nevertheless, we will still illustrate certain insights in the
Gaussian example considered above, while restricting, for simplicity, the shocks to be perfectly
correlated (of = 0).
3 Decentralized use of information
In this section we show how the equilibrium and the efficient use of information depend on the
payoff structure U. This permits us to identify inefficiencies in the equilibrium use of information
that originate from payoff effects.
3.1 Common-information benchmarks
Before we proceed to the analysis of equilibrium and efficiency with dispersed information, it is
useful to review the case of common information; this will help isolate the inefficiencies that emerge
only under dispersed information.
To start, suppose that information were complete, so that each agent knows both his own
productivity and the cross-sectional distribution h of productivities in the population, and this
fact is common knowledge. We can then show that the complete-information equilibrium strategy
exists, is unique, and is given by
fcj = K (0i,6) = Ko + KiOi + K2O,
where 9 = J9dh(8) denotes aggregate productivity and where the coefficients (kq , ki,K2) are
determined by the payoff structure. 10 Note that, by definition, an agent's payoff depends only on
his own productivity; that an agent's equilibrium action depends also on average productivity is
The characterization of the coefficients (ko, rei, K2) , as well as of the coefficients (k3> k !j k2) f°r the first-best
allocation, is in the proof of Proposition 1. These coefficients depend on the reduced-form payoff structure U,
which in turn depends on the particular application under consideration. For the purposes of our analysis, however,
understanding the specific values of these coefficients is not essential.
because the latter impacts the average action of others, which in turn affects the incentives of the
individual agent.
We can further show that the first-best allocation exists, is unique, and is given by
ki = K* (0i, 6) = «5 + K\6i + K*2 6, .
where the coefficients (k^, fc*,^) are again determined by the payoff structure. Note that, as with
equilibrium, the first-best action prescribed to an agent depends both on his own productivity and
on aggregate productivity; however, the dependence on aggregate productivity now emerges only
because of external effects.
Now suppose that information is incomplete but common across all agents. Because of the
quadratic specification of payoffs, a form of certainty equivalence holds: the equilibrium and effi-
cient actions under incomplete but common information are the best predictors of their complete-
information counterparts.
Proposition 1 Suppose all information is common. The unique equilibrium strategy is given by
ki = E[k (9i,6) \V], while the strategy that maximizes welfare is given by ki = E[rc* (Oi,0) \V], where
V denotes the common information set.
Clearly, in e-conomies in which k = k* , there is no room for policy intervention as long as
information remains common. However, as we will show in the next few sections, even in these
economies there can be room for policy intervention once information is dispersed. 11
3.2 Equilibrium use of information
We now turn to the analysis of equilibrium allocations when information is dispersed and when
there is no policy intervention. We define an equilibrium in the standard Bayes-Nash fashion.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a (measurable) strategy k : fi —? M. such that, for all u & Q,
fc(w) = argmax R[U(k,K (</>),
a
k {<f>), 6) \ u }, (2)
fc
with K(<t>) = JQ k (u') dcj){J) and ak ((t>) = [/n [* (a/) - Ki^fd^J)} 1 ! 2 for all <f> e $.
Consider the following coefficient, which is the slope of an individual's best response with
respect to aggregate activity:
a
= ^rk (3)
This coefficient measures the degree of strategic complementarity or substitutability among indi-
vidual actions. The equilibrium use of information can then be characterized as follows.
'None of our results requires k
=fc re*. Indeed, the reader may henceforth assume k, = k* if he/she wishes to focus
on economies in which inefficiency emerges only under dispersed information.
10
Proposition 2 The equilibrium strategy exists, is unique, and satisfies
fc(w) = E[K(6,6)+a-(K((f>)-K(6,6)) \u] (4)
for all wefi, with K(cf>) — JQ k (a/) dcj>(uj') for all (p G $.
Although Proposition 2 does not provide a closed-form solution for the equilibrium strategy, it
is an insightful representation of it. To see this, recall that K,(9i,9) is the action agent i would have
taken had information been complete. Next, note that K{</>) — k(9, 9) is the average deviation in the
actions other agents are taking relative to what they would have done under complete information.
When actions are strategically independent (a = 0), a form of certainty equivalence continues to
hold: an agent's equilibrium action under incomplete information is simply his expectation of the
action he would have taken under complete information. When instead actions are interdependent
(a / 0), the agent adjusts his action away from the aforementioned certainty-equivalence bench-
mark on the basis of his expectation of the average deviation in the population. In particular,
if actions are strategic complements (a > 0), the agent adjusts his action upwards whenever he
expects aggregate activity to be higher than what it would have been under complete information,
while he does the opposite if actions are strategic substitutes (a < 0). In other words, equilibrium
behavior is tilted to permit more alignment of actions when a > and more differentiation when
a < 0. The coefficient a thus also captures how much agents value aligning their choices with one
another.
Proposition 2 has direct implications for how information is used in equilibrium. Because
relying on common sources of information facilitates alignment of individual choices, while relying
on idiosyncratic sources inhibits it, strategic complementarity increases the sensitivity of equilibrium
actions to the former and reduces the sensitivity to the latter, while the converse is true for strategic
substitutability.
To see this more clearly, consider the case where the agents' shocks are perfectly correlated and
information is Gaussian. In this example, 9i = 9 for all i, where 9 ~ N (/z, af) , and the information
of agent i consists of a private signal xi = 9 + & and a public signal y — 9 + e, where £, ~ N (/z, a 2 )
is idiosyncratic noise and e ~ iV (0, aVj. The unique equilibrium is then
k(x, y) = k + («i + «2) [ltiH + lyV + Ixx] , (5)
where the coefficients (7^,7^,71) are given by
7 = E? ~ "Ov 7 = C
1 -")^
,
6)
7T0 + 7Ty + (1 - a)lTx TTg +7Ty -r (1 - Ot)lTx TTQ + 7Ty + (1 - Q) 7TX
and where irg = o-g 2
,
ny
= cr~
2
,
and ttx = a~2 denote the precisions of, respectively, the prior, the
public signal, and the private signal.
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A higher a reduces 7X and raises 7^ and 7y : stronger complementarity tilts the use of informa-
tion towards the prior and the public signal because they are relatively better predictors of others'
activity. Next, note that 7x + 7y = 1 — 7^, so that the equilibrium action of agent i can also be
expressed in terms of the underlying fundamentals and noises as follows:
h = k + («i + k2 ) [7^M + (1 - 7m)# + 7y£ + 7x&] >
By strengthening the anchoring effect of the prior, stronger complementarity dampens the overall
sensitivity of individual actions to changes in the underlying fundamentals; in other words, it
increases "inertia." By increasing the reliance to noisy public information, it also amplifies the
impact of common noise and hence increases the non-fundamental volatility of aggregate activity.
Finally, by reducing the reliance on noisy private information it mitigates the impact of idiosyncratic
noise and hence reduces the non-fundamental cross-sectional dispersion in activity.
Beyond the Gaussian example, a closed-form solution of the equilibrium strategy can be ob-
tained in terms of the hierarchy of beliefs regarding the underlying fundamentals.
Corollary 1 Let E 1 = J E[8\u]d(fi(u)) denote the average of the agents' expectations of their own
shocks and, for any n>2, let En = J E[E
n~ l
\(J\d4>{u>) denote the corresponding n-th order average
expectation. The equilibrium strategy is given by
k{tu)=E[K(9,§)\uj} Vw, (7)
where 9 = £~
=] ((1 - aja"" 1 ) En .
The equilibrium action under incomplete information thus has the same structure as the one
under common information replacing 9 with 9. The latter is simply a weighted sum of the entire
hierarchy of expectations about the underlying shocks, with the weights depending on the degree of
complementarity: the stronger the complementarity, the higher the relative weight on higher order
expectations. Since higher order expectations tend to be more anchored to common sources of
information, this suggests that the intuitions provided by the Gaussian example are more general.
3.3 Efficient use of information
We now turn to the following question. Suppose the government can not centralize information,
or otherwise transfer information from one agent to another, but can manipulate the way agents
use their available information. Can the government then improve upon the equilibrium use of
information?
In this section we address this question by bypassing the details of specific policy instruments
that may permit such manipulation and instead characterizing directly the strategy that maximizes
welfare under the sole restriction that information can not be centralized. We henceforth call this
strategy the efficient strategy, or the efficient use of information.
12
Definition 2 An efficient strategy is a mapping k* : Cl —> R that maximizes ex-ante utility.
Because payoffs are linear in transfers, the latter impact welfare only through incentives. Hence,
the combination of the efficient strategy with any transfer scheme that makes this strategy incentive
compatible defines the very best the government can do without centralizing information. That is,
when implementable, the efficient strategy is welfare-equivalent to the best incentive-compatible
direct mechanism among the ones that restrict the actions the planner recommends to each agent
to depend only on his report and not on the reports made by other agents. We will show how the
efficient strategy can be implemented in the next section; here, we focus on its characterization.
Towards this goal, consider any arbitrary strategy k : Q —> M and let
k(9;h) = E[k{u>)\9,h}
denote the component of individual activity that is "explained" by the fundamentals. Similarly, let
K(h)=E[k\h]= I k{9;h)dh{9) and o%(h) = Var(fc - K\h) = / [k(6;h) - K{h)] 2 dh{9)
be the fundamental components of the mean and the dispersion of activity. The action of any given
agent i can be decomposed in three components:
h — hi + e + V{
The term k\ captures the variation in individual activity that reflects variation in fundamentals.
The term e = (K— K) captures the non-fundamental variation in individual activity that is common
across agents; that is, e captures the impact of common noise in information. Finally, the term
Vi = (k — K) — (k — K) captures the non-fundamental variation in individual activity that is
idiosyncratic to the agent; that is, u; captures the impact of idiosyncratic noise. 12
The following result then shows that a similar decomposition applies to ex-ante welfare.
Lemma 1 Given any strategy k : Q. —> M, ex-ante utility (welfare) is given by
Eu = E[U(k, K, <7fc) 9)} + ^Wvol vol + ±Wdis dis (8)
where WvoL = Ukk + 2U2ki< + UKK < and Wdis = Ukk + Uda < 0, and where
vol = Var (e) = Var (K) - Vax(K) and dis = Var (vt ) - Var (k - K) - Var(fc - I<).
The first term in (8) captures the welfare effects of the fundamental-driven variation in activity.
The other two terms capture the welfare effects of the residual variation in activity: vol measures
non-fundamental aggregate volatility, which originates in common noise, while dis measures non-
fundamental cross-sectional dispersion, which originates in idiosyncratic noise. The coefficients Wvoi
Note that, by construction, hi, e and Vi are orthogonal one to the other.
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and Wdis then summarize the sensitivity of welfare to these two types of noise: Wvo\ measures social
aversion to non-fundamental volatility, while Wdis measures social aversion to non-fundamental
dispersion.
Both non-fundamental volatility and non-fundamental dispersion contribute to a reduction
in welfare because of the concavity of payoffs. How much each of them contributes to welfare
losses depends on the details of the application under examinations: different primitive preferences,
technologies and market structures induce different social preferences over volatility and dispersion.
For our purposes, however, it suffices to summarize these social preferences in the coefficients Wvoi
and Wiii s . Their relative contribution can then be measured by the following coefficient:
Since Wvo\ captures social aversion to volatility, while Wdis captures social aversion to dispersion,
higher a* can be interpreted as higher aversion to dispersion relative to volatility.
Strategies that share the same fundamental-driven variation in activity may differ in the levels of
non-fundamental volatility and dispersion that they induce. Intuitively, the higher the sensitivity of
actions to common sources of information relative to idiosyncratic sources, the higher the exposure
to common noise relative to idiosyncratic noise, and hence the higher the non-fundamental volatility
of activity relative to its dispersion. One should thus expect the efficient strategy to depend on social
preferences over volatility and dispersion. This insight is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The efficient strategy exists, is unique, 13 and satisfies
k(u) = E[ k*(6, 6) + a* (K{<f>) - k*(8, 9)) \u] (10)
for almost all u, with K{4>) — Jn k (u/) d(f>(uj') for all <f>.
In equilibrium, an agent's action was anchored to his expectation of k, the complete-information
equilibrium action; however, it was also adjusted on the basis of his expectation of aggregate activity,
K, with the weight on the latter given by a. A similar result holds for the efficient strategy once we
replace k with k* and a with a*. It follows that, just as a summarized the private value of aligning
actions across agents, a* summarizes the social value of such alignment.
That the efficient strategy is anchored to k*
,
the first-best action, is quite intuitive. That a*
in turn is inversely related to the ratio Wvoi/Wdi s reflects our preceding discussion about volatility
and dispersion: the degree of alignment associated with the efficient strategy increases with social
aversion to dispersion and decreases with social aversion to volatility.
13
Hereafter, when we say unique, we mean up to a zero-measure subset of Q\ this is a standard qualification that
one has to make with a continuum of types.
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Furthermore, just as a pinned down the relative sensitivity of equilibrium actions to different
sources of information, a* pins down the corresponding relative sensitivity of efficient actions. To
see this more clearly, consider again the Gaussian example with perfectly correlated shocks. The
efficient strategy is then given by
k(x,y) =k* + (k* + k%) [j*^ + JyV + J*x x] , (11)
for almost all (x,j/), where the coefficients (7^,7y,7z) are given by
*
=
kj_
=
TTy
_
{l-a*)nx
** ne + ny + {1 - a*yTTx
'
ly
n9 + iry + (1 - a*)7rx
'
lx
irg + iry + (1 - a*) irx
'
It follows that, just as a determines the equilibrium levels of inertia, non-fundamental volatility
and dispersion, a* determines the levels that are optimal from a social perspective. As for the case
of more general information structures, the analogue of Corollary 1 applies for the efficient strategy
once we replace k with k* and a with a*.
3.4 Inefficiency only under dispersed information
To further appreciate the inefficiencies that can emerge due to the dispersion of information, con-
sider economies in which k = k*. In these economies, the equilibrium is (first-best) efficient
whenever information is common, leaving no room for policy intervention. Nevertheless, whenever
a y£ a* , inefficiency emerges under dispersed information, opening the door to policy intervention.
The following is then an immediate implication of the results in the preceding sections.
Corollary 2 Consider an economy that is efficient under common information (k = k*).
(i) The equilibrium is efficient under dispersed information if and only if a — a*;
(ii) When a > a* and information is Gaussian, the equilibrium exhibits overreaction to public
information and excessive non-fundamental volatility.
(iii) When a < a* and information is Gaussian, the equilibrium exhibits overreaction to private
information and excessive non-fundamental dispersion.
4 Optimal policy
We now turn to the core contribution of the paper. We first explain how different tax schemes
affect the decentralized use of information. We then identify the tax schemes that implement the
efficient use of information as an equilibrium.
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4.1 Equilibrium with taxes
Suppose that the information that is publicly available at stage 3 includes all individual actions
fa)ie[o,i] as wen as aggregate productivity 9.
u Then, without any loss of optimality (as it will
become clear in the next subsection), consider policies defined by
Ti = T (ki,K,ak,8)
,
where the function T : R2 x R+ x —> R is a quadratic polynomial in (k,K,9), it is linear in
o\, and satisfies the following properties: Ukk — Tkk < 0, — $k Z.t k < ^> T (K,K,0,6) = for
all {K,6), and Tkk + T^ = 0. These properties preserve existence and uniqueness of equilibrium,
while also guaranteeing budget balance state-by-state. 15 We denote the class of policies that satisfy
these properties by T. Finally, note that this class includes both progressive tax schemes (i.e., with
Tkk > 0) and regressive tax schemes (i.e., with Tkk < 0). 16 One should thus think of this as a non-
linear tax-schedule that does not directly depend on individual productivity (0;), but is contingent
on aggregate outcomes (K,ak,9)
We then have the following result (to simplify the formulas, we henceforth normalize the payoff
structure by setting Ukk — ~ 1| the general case is in the appendix).
Proposition 4 Given any tax scheme T G T, let
a - TkR
a
l + Tkk
_
_
{l-a)KQ-Tk (0,0,0) . 1 . _ (1 - a) fa + k2 ) - Tk§ .
1 - a + Tkk + TkK ~ 1 + Tkk l-a + Tkk + TkK
The equilibrium strategy exists, is unique, and satisfies
k((j)=E[k(e,e)+a(K((l>)-k(9,e)) \u>] (13)
for all u> G fi, where k(9, 9) = Rq + k\9 + k2 9 and K(4>) = JQ k {&') d4>{ui') for all cf>.
There are three instruments that permit the government to influence the agents' activity: Tkk,
the progressivity of the tax system; TkK, the contingency of marginal taxes on aggregate activity;
and Tk§, the contingency of marginal taxes on aggregate productivity. While all these instruments
matter for equilibrium outcomes, each of them has a distinctive role. The progressivity Tkk 1S the
only instrument that permits the government to control k\, the sensitivity of the agents' actions
to their information about their own productivity shocks. For given Tkk, the instrument that
14We relax this assumption in Section 4.3.
15To see the latter property, note that, for any cross-sectional distribution ip of individual activity,
/ T (*, K , a k , 6) d-4, (k) = T (K, K, 0, 6) + \{Tkk + Taa )al
In our environment, the progressivity of the tax system will turn out to affect the decentralized use of information,
but it does not interfere with redistributive concerns; this is because of the linearity of payoffs in transfers.
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permits the government to control the degree of complementarity (a) and thereby the sensitivity of
actions to common noise relative to idiosyncratic noise is the contingency T^k of taxes on aggregate
activity. Finally, for given T^k and T^k, the instrument that permits the government to control
the sensitivity of individual actions to variations in aggregate productivity is the contingency Tk§
of marginal taxes on 9.
4.2 Implementation of the efficient strategy
We now turn to the question of whether there exists a policy T* £ T that implements the efficient
strategy as an equilibrium. Whenever this is the case, by the very definition of the efficient strategy,
this also guarantees that there is no other transfer scheme that can improve upon T*. This is true
even for transfer schemes that violate budget balance and/or anonymity, and even if one allows the
agents to send arbitrary messages to the planner and the planner to make the transfers contingent
on these messages. What is essential is only that the planner does not send informative messages to
the agents before they commit their choices. The next result establishes existence and uniqueness
of a policy T* e T that implements the efficient allocation.
Proposition 5 A policy in T that implements the efficient strategy always exists, is unique, and
has the property that, for given (k,k*) , the optimal T^k increases with a and decreases with a*.
The proof of this result is follows from Proposition 4. First, note that there exists a unique Tkk
such that k\ — k*. But then there also exists a unique T^k such that a — a*, a unique Tkg such
that K2 = «£, and a unique Tk (0, 0, 0) such that Rq — Kq. The rest of the parameters of the policy
function T are then pinned down by budget balance, establishing that there exists a unique policy
that implements the efficient strategy as an equilibrium. 17
The optimal policy has the property that, keeping k and n* constant, the optimal T^k increases
with a and decreases with a* . This is because a higher TkK, by reducing the degree of complemen-
tarity perceived by the agents, it reduces the sensitivity of individual decisions to common noise
in information. If we thus look across economies that share the same equilibrium and efficiency
properties under complete information (i.e., they feature the same k, and k*) but differ in these
properties under incomplete information (i.e., they feature different a and a*), we then find that
the optimal TkK is higher in economies that exhibit a larger discrepancy between the private and
the social value of aligning choices; equivalently, the optimal T^k is higher the more excessive the
non-fundamental volatility of the equilibrium relative to its non-fundamental dispersion.
17The uniqueness result holds for "regular" information structures. For "non-regular" information structures, the
degree of complementarity is irrelevant, leaving one degree of indeterminacy. See Section 4.5 for such a case.
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4.3 Implementation with measurement error
The policies considered so far do not require that the government have superior information than
the agents at any time: the taxes are conditioned on information that is public at the time taxes
are levied. However, the preceding analysis has assumed that actions are perfectly revealed at that
time. In contrast, for many applications it may be more appropriate to assume that actions, as
well as aggregate fundamentals, are only imperfectly observed.
To accommodate this possibility, we now consider a variant that allows actions and average
productivity to be observed with noise in stage 3. In particular, if agent i chooses fcj in stage 2, then
in stage 3 the government—and all other agents—observes ki = fcj + 77 + v{, where 77 is a common
noise while Vi is an idiosyncratic noise, with respective variances a'i and a2,. Similarly, instead of
the true aggregate productivity 9, the government—as well as any other agent—observes a signal
9 = 9 + <;, where ? is noise with variance a2 . All these noises could be interpreted as measurement
errors and are assumed to be independent of the fundamentals and of the information that agents
have in stage 2. We then let K = K + 77 and a2 = o~\ + a2 denote, respectively, the cross-sectional
average and dispersion of k, and consider tax schedules of the form
tz = T(ki,K,ak ,9),
where the function T is assumed to satisfy the same properties as in the previous section (i.e.
T E T). The tax an agent expects to pay is then given by:
E[T(fc2 ,A-,a fc,0)M = mF{ki,K,akt 9)\u)i)
+ 12(Tkk + 2TkK + TKK)a2
ri
+ ±(Tkk + Taa )a2v + Tgecjl
The last three terms in (14) capture the impact of measurement errors on the expected tax. Because
these terms are independent of the agents' actions, they have no impact on individual incentives
and hence they do not interfere with the incentives provided by the tax system. It follows that,
not only the noise does not interfere with the ability to implement the efficient strategy, but also
it does not affect the properties of the optimal tax system.
Of course, the last property relies on the noise being additive (i.e., separable from the agents'
actions). When, instead, the noise is multiplicative, it does impact incentives. However, by appro-
priately adjusting the policy, the government can fully undo the incentive effects of the noise. It
follows that measurement error once again does not interfere with the ability to implementable the
efficient strategy, although it now may affect the details of the optimal tax system.
Proposition 6 The efficient strategy can be implemented regardless of whether activity and fun-
damentals are observed with measurement error.
Given this result, for the remainder of the analysis we can abstract from measurement error
without any significant loss of generality.
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4.4 Inefficiency only under dispersed information
As mentioned in Section 1, financial-market observers—at both the academic and the policy front
—
are often concerned about how information is processed in financial markets. In particular, while
many believe that financial markets work well on average, many also feel that financial markets
often overreact to noisy public news, causing excessive non-fundamental volatility in both asset
prices and real investment. At some level, this possibility can be captured in our framework by
the restriction that k = k* and a > a*. More generally, economies in which k — k* but a ^ a*
offer an interesting benchmark because in these economies policy intervention becomes desirable
only when information is dispersed. We now thus examine the properties of optimal policy for this
special class economies.
Because a ^ a* means that the equilibrium is inefficient in its relative response to different
sources of information and hence to different types of noise, it is necessary that the marginal tax
co-varies with the components of activity that are not explained by the fundamentals. In particular,
letting e = K — K denote the component of activity that is due to common noise, we have the
following result.
Corollary 3 Consider economies in which inefficiency emerges only under dispersed information.
When a > a* , the optimal policy has T^k > and the marginal tax co-varies positively with e. The
converse is true when a < a*
.
This result is intuitive. In situations in which, if it were not for policy intervention, the equilib-
rium would exhibit overreaction to common sources of information and excessive non-fundamental
volatility, the optimal marginal tax co-varies positively with the common noise that drives this non-
fundamental volatility. It is then precisely this property of the tax system that discourages agents
from overreacting to common sources of information and dampens non-fundamental volatility.
Note, however, that this appealing property of the tax system is achieved only in an indirect
way, without any need to monitor and quantify the various sources of information available to the
agents. This is done by making marginal taxes contingent on observable aggregate outcomes. In
particular, when a > a*
,
the optimal policy reduces the complementarity in individual actions,
and thereby dampens the reaction of the equilibrium to common noise, by making the contingency
of marginal taxes on realized aggregate activity positive (T^k > 0). The optimal policy then
guarantees that the overall response of the equilibrium to aggregate productivity is not distorted
by making the marginal tax also a decreasing function of realized aggregate productivity (Tkg < 0).
4.5 Idiosyncratic vs aggregate shocks
Another special case of interest is the case of independent private values typically considered in
the new public finance literature. Studying this particular case helps appreciate how our policy
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results depend on the dispersion of information regarding aggregate shocks, as opposed to purely
idiosyncratic shocks.
Within our framework, this case can be captured as follows: first, suppose that Ui = 6{, so
that 9i is the private information of agent i and <f> — h; second, suppose that the cross-sectional
distribution h is common knowledge, so that there is no uncertainty about the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of types in society. Because 0, the cross-sectional distribution of information, is common
knowledge, in equilibrium aggregate investment is also common knowledge. Together with the fact
that h, and hence 8, is commonly known and the fact that &i is known to agent i, this implies
that the unique equilibrium is given by k (wj) = K (0i,6~) . Similarly, the efficient allocation is given
by k (uji) = k* (Qi,Q) As a result, neither a matters for equilibrium behavior, nor a* matters for
efficient allocations. We conclude that in the case of independent private values it is not necessary
to condition the tax system on realized aggregate activity. 18
What renders a and a*
,
and hence also the contingency TkK, irrelevant in the aforementioned
environment is not per se the fact that private values are independent but rather that there is
no strategic uncertainty: no agent faces uncertainty regarding the distribution of actions in the
population. Indeed, if we relax either the assumption that #; is known to agent i or the assumption
that h is common knowledge but maintain the assumption that is common knowledge, then the
distribution of actions is also common knowledge in equilibrium. This in turn eliminates the problem
of forecasting aggregate activity, once again guaranteeing that neither a matters for equilibrium
behavior nor a* matters for the efficient allocation—and therefore nor T^k is essential for achieving
efficiency. We conclude that the key distinctive property of the correlated-value environments we
consider in this paper is the strategic uncertainty created by the dispersion of information regarding
aggregate shocks.
Corollary 4 When the cross-sectional distribution of information in society ((f)) is common knowl-
edge, the contingency of taxes on aggregate activity (TkK) is i}°t essential for implementing the
efficient strategy.
5 A dynamic economy
The analysis so far has been confined to a static game. We now show how this static game can
be embedded in a dynamic setting with a more macro flavor. This serves two goals. First, it
helps further appreciate how our results can be relevant for applications. Second, it accommodates
1 In particular, the efficient allocation can be implemented with a tax schedule that depends only on own activity
and 9. Moreover, should the tax be made contingent on K, this contingency would matter for equilibrium behavior only
through k.2 (the sensitivity of the complete-information equilibrium to 9), not through a (the degree of alignment);
the contingency on 9 should then be adjusted to perfectly offset the effect of TkK on k.2-
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the possibility that interesting dynamics in actions originate in the dynamics of information. In
this section, we start by taking the dynamics of information as entirely exogenous; we turn to the
analysis of endogenous information in Section 6.
5.1 Set up
There are N + 1 periods, with TV > 2. In each period t = 1, ..., N, each agent i chooses his level
of investment in a riskless discount bond, 6j jt , and his level of consumption, Q it . The agent also
chooses an action ki >t £ R, which we henceforth interpret as capital invested in a risky technology.
Investing ki
t
t costs G (kij) in period t and delivers F (hij, Kt, o>t, Aij+i) in period t+1, where Kt
and at are the mean and the dispersion of activities in period t, A,i+i is an exogenous productivity
shock, and G and F are real-valued functions. To simplify the exposition, we henceforth impose
that the productivity shocks are perfectly correlated across agents, so that
./U.t+i — &t f°r au *»*
(The timing convention we adopt here is that 9t denotes the common shock that is relevant for
period-^ decisions.)
The agent's period-i budget is given by
Ci,t + G{ki>t ) + qtbiit = F(ki tt-i,Kt-i,at-i,9t-i) +biit-\ -n it ,
where qt denotes the period-i price of discount bonds (the reciprocal of the period— t risk-free
rate) and r^ denotes the period-t taxes the agent pays to (or the transfers he receives from) the
government. 19 Finally, the agent's intertemporal preferences are given by
N+l
where Ut is a real-valued function.
This framework is quite flexible. All the applications we considered in the static benchmark
can be nested by setting U(c,k) = c and then letting —G(k) + (3F(k,K,a,6) equal the payoffs
assumed in those statics examples (e.g., —G{k) + @F(k, K,a,8) can be interpreted as the profit of
a firm)
.
Alternatively, a stylized version of the neoclassical growth model with convex investment
costs is nested by letting U (c, k) = c, F (k, K, ct, 9) = 9k, and G (k) = k + x/c2 , for some constant
X > 0. One could also interpret k as individual effort, in which case it would be natural to let
G (k) = and U (c, k) = c — H(k), with H{k) = k2 representing the disutility of effort. Finally, one
could further allow U and G to depend on (K,a,9), as to capture externalities in leisure, pecuniary
externalities in the costs of investment, and so on.
19 For t = N + 1, we impose that ki,t = &i,t = for all i, in which case the last-period budget constraint reduces
to Cj,n+i = F (ki
t
N, Kn, on, An+i) — G (0) 4- bi,/v — tj,n+i- Furthermore, for t = 1, without loss, we normalize each
agent's endowment to zero so that F(ki,o,Ko,(Jo,Ai) = bj,o = for all i.
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If agents had common information about the shocks in all periods, then the analysis could
proceed essentially without any further restrictions on the functions F, G and U. Here, however, we
are interested in cases where agents have heterogeneous information. To keep the analysis tractable,
we impose two restrictions. First, we assume that U is linear in consumption: U(c,k) — c — H(k),
for some function H. Second, we let
V {k, K, a, 0) = -[G (fc) + H{k)} + 0F {k, K, a, 9)
and assume that V satisfies the same properties with respect to (k, K, a, 9) as the function U in the
static model. The first restriction ensures that, in all periods and states, the bond market clears if
and only if q% = /3 (in which case the demand for the risk-free bond is indeterminate) and that the
life-time utility of agent i (in the absence of taxes) reduces to
N
Ui^Y^p^V {kiiUKt ,at ,6t )
t=\
The second restriction then permits to extend our previous static analysis to the dynamic model.
The key here is to rule out informational externalities—the possibility that what an agent
knows in period t about Ot depends on the actions other agents took in periods s < t. To ensure
this, we model the dynamics of the information structure as follows. The (exogenous) information
of an agent in period t is represented by LOi tt 6 fit- Let / G F denote a joint distribution for
{&t,Wi,t}tLi> with marginal distributions for u>lit given by 4>t 6 $t- The distribution / also describes
the cross-sectional distribution of {6t,u)i
tt}tL\ in the population. First, Nature draws / from a set
of possible distributions F according to the probability measure T. Nature then uses / to draw a
sequence {Oti^i^tLi f°r each agent i, with {9t,(^i,t}tLi drawn independently from /. Finally, we
assume that (a>i,t-i,0t-i,0t-i) belongs to Ui
t
t, for all i and t. This ensures that there is nothing to
learn about (8s ,4>s )g=t from the observation of other agents' (past) actions—whether such actions
are observable is then irrelevant. 20 It is then without loss of generality, for either equilibrium or
efficiency, to restrict attention to strategies that depend only on w;^.
5.2 Equilibrium, efficiency and policy
Given that information is exogenous in all dates and states, the analysis of both the equilibrium and
efficient allocations parallels that in the static benchmark. Let k (9) denote the (unique) solution
to Vjt (k, k, 0, 6) — and let k* (6) = argmaxK V (k, k, 0,9) ; if information were complete, the
equilibrium action in period t would be k (9t ) , while the first-best action would be k* (9 t ) .
21 Next,
20An alternative that would also guarantee that agents do not learn anything about (9S , <t>s)^=t from the observation
of past actions is to assume that for all t > 1, uJi it is a sufficient statistic for (u>i : t, (^i,s,<^s,^s)s=i) with respect to
21 Both k and k" are linear functions of 6. In particular, k.(9) = ko + (m + K.2) and k'(8) = kJ + (kJ + k,1)6 with
the coefficients (ko,ki,K2, «o iK*,^) determined as in the proof of Proposition 1 replacing U with V.
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let
Vki<
, * ,
Wvoi
a
= 'v^
and a=1
~w^'
with Wvoi = Vkk + 2VkK + Vkk and Wdis = Vjtfc + Vaa \ once again, a summarizes the private value
of aligning choices (the equilibrium degree of complementarity), while a* summarizes the social
value of such alignment (the relative social aversion to dispersion and volatility). The equilibrium
and efficient allocations under incomplete information are then characterized in the following two
propositions, which are direct extensions of Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 7 The equilibrium strategy exists, is unique, and satisfies, for all periods t and all
w*
€ fit,
fct(wt) = E[ K (et ) + a-(Kt (<j>t)- Kt (6t )) \ut ],
withKt {4> t ) =/fct (u/)#t(w').
Proposition 8 The efficient strategy exists, is unique, and satisfies, for all periods t and almost
all wt £ Of,
kt(6H) = E[ k* (6 t ) + a* (Kt {&) - k* (6t )) \ ut ],
with Kt ((p t ) = fQ kt (to') d(f>t (u>').
The efficient strategy can be implemented in a similar fashion as in Section 4. In particular,
efficiency can be induced in period t by making taxes in period t + 1 contingent on information
about Kt and 8t that becomes publicly available at t + 1. As in the static model, the optimal policy
does not require any informational advantage on the side of the government. It merely depends on
the agents anticipating when they make their decision that the marginal tax they will pay in the
future will be contingent on public information about aggregate economic conditions.
6 Informational externalities
A key functioning of modern economies that is missed in our preceding analysis is the aggregation
of dispersed information in various indicators of aggregate activity, such as financial prices, trade
volume, aggregate employment, output and investment data. What is crucial for our purposes is
that the informational content of these indicators depends on the way agents use their available
information in the first place: the more individuals rely on their private information, the more
informative aggregate activity is of the underlying fundamentals. The various channels of infor-
mation aggregation and social learning thus introduce informational externalities that have to be
taken into account when determining the socially optimal use of information.
We study this issue, and its policy implications, within a variant of the dynamic framework
introduced in the previous section. Past shocks are no longer directly revealed to the agents. Rather,
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the agents learn about these shocks from the observation of a noisy signal of past aggregate activity.
This signal is a proxy for the informational role of macroeconomic data, financial prices, and other
channels of information aggregation and social learning.
6.1 Set up
To be able to analyze the endogenous dynamics of information in a tractable way, we must sac-
rifice some of the generality we have permitted in the preceding analysis: we henceforth restrict
all exogenous information to be Gaussian. In particular, we assume that the component of the
fundamentals about which the agents have heterogeneous information is constant over time, we
denote this component by 9, and we assume that it is drawn from a Normal distribution with mean
\x and variance ag. The realization of 8 is never revealed. Instead, at any date t, agents observe a
public signal yt — 9 + et and private signals Xi tt = # + &,*, where e t ~ Af(0, cr^t ) and £j jt ~ Af{0, cr^ t )
are noises, independent of one another, independent across time, and independent of 9, with ^
also independently and identically distributed across agents. In addition, at any date t > 2, agents
observe the following three random variables, which affect payoffs and convey information about
9: Kt_i = Kt_i + T]t , at-i = at-i + vt , and A t = 9 + at , where rjt ~ Af(Q,tf t ), vt ~ J\f{Q,al t ),
and at ~ M(0, a^ t ) are shocks, common across agents, independent across time, and independent
of any other random variable. The period-i budget of the agent is given by
Cij + G{ki>t ) + qt biit = F(kitt-i,Kt-i,at-i,A t ) + bitt-i -riit .
The variable A t can be interpreted as the period— t productivity shock, while 9 is the underlying
mean (trend) productivity. That the variables Kt-i and Ot-l that enter period— t income (through
F) coincide with the signals about past activity is not essential. What is essential is that the
observation of income does not perfectly reveal either 9 or Kt-i- 22
The rest of the model is as in Section 5. The intertemporal payoff of an agent is given by
J2t=i ft^U (ci tt,ki,t) , where U (c^t, fc^t) = c^— h{ki tt)- That preferences are linear in consumption
ensures once again that qt — (3, that the trades of riskless bonds and the timing of consumption are
indeterminate, and that the intertemporal payoff of an agent (in the absence of taxes) reduces to
N+l
Y,0
t~1
V-(kiitl Kt i *i,Ai+ i
t=i
where V (k, K, a, A) = —[G(k) + H(k)} + /3F (k,K,a,A) . The function V is quadratic and satisfies
the same restrictions as in the previous sections.
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Also, the results that follow do not depend on whether the signals about past actions are public or private.
In particular, we could allow the agents to receive private signals Ki,t-\ = Kt-i + 7?i,t, ot-\ = ot-\ + 1^,0 and
Ai,t = 6 + a,i lt , in addition to, or in substitution for, the aforementioned public signals.
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6.2 Equilibrium
The essential difference between the economy of this section and the one examined in Section 5
is the endogeneity of information: the strategy agents follow in period t determines how much
information about 8 is contained in (Kt ,at) and hence affects the agents' behavior in periods t+ 1
on. In the absence of policy, this informational externality is not internalized by the agents: the
fact that the use of information in the present affects the information available in the future does
not alter private incentives. Thus, letting once again k(0), — kq + («i + K2)9 denote the unique
solution to Vk (k,k,0,6) — and a = —VkKJVkk-, we have the following result.
Proposition 9 The equilibrium strategy exists and is unique. Let {^j,^t}i=1 denote the (unique)
information structure generated by the equilibrium strategy. Then, for all t, the strategy and the
information structure jointly satisfy
kt(ut ) = E[K(6) + a-(Kt (ct>t)-K(9)) \ut ] (15)
for all u) t e Hi, with Kt (4> t ) = JQ kt (to 1 ) d(p t {uj') for all <j)t <E $ t -
This result does not require the information structure to be Gaussian. However, once we restrict
8 and the exogenous noises to be Gaussian, this result ensures that the information contained in the
signals of past activity is also Gaussian. All the information—exogenous and endogenous—that is
available in any given period can then be summarized in two sufficient statistics, one for the private
and the other for the public signals; the dynamics of these two statistics admit a simple recursive
structure and the equilibrium strategy reduces to an affine combination of the two.
Proposition 10 The equilibrium strategy is given by
h,t (ui,t) = k {ltXi,t + (1 - It) Yt)
,
with
•* = n Tt y ^(l-a)TTf +7lf
The variables Xij and Yt are sufficient statistics for all the private and public information about 8
that is available to agent i in period t, while nf and tt\ are their respective precisions. The sufficient
statistics are given recursively by
7rf_! (J-j -k\_ a'} a~ 2 7t
2
-i («i + ^2? g£? _
Xi,t = —^-Ai.t-i +—rxi,t and Yt = —y-Yt-i + -%-yt+ -By-At+ y —Vt (17)
7Tf iff iri vrf ir
y
t
IT?
where
Kt_i - k - {ki + k2 ) (l - lt-\)Yt-i /1Q ,
Vt = -.
—
v (18)
(«1 + K2 )7i_l
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is a linear transformation of the signal of past activity. Similarly, the precisions irf and ir\ are
given recursively by
TT?=Kti+°x 2t and ^ = 7rf_ 1 +a-t
2
+ a- t
2
+ (Kl +AC2 )
2
7t
2
-i^ 42 - (19)
Finally, the initial conditions are Xifi — 0, l^o = Mi 7o — 0, tTq = and 7Tq = o~e .
The logic behind condition (16) is the same as the one we encountered in the static benchmark.
For given degree of complementarity a, the relative sensitivity 7* of the equilibrium strategy to
private information increases with the precision of private information and decreases with the
precision of public information. At the same, for given precisions, a higher a tilts the equilibrium
strategy away from private information and towards public information, as agents find it optimal
to better align their choices.
Conditions (17)-(19), on the other hand, describe the endogenous evolution of the information,
which can be understood as follows. First note that, because Xi it-\ equals 6 plus idiosyncratic
noise, aggregate activity in period t — 1 is given by
Kt-i =k + («i + K2 ) (lt-10 + (1 - 7t-i) Yt-\) .
Because Yt ~\ is publicly known (and so are the coefficients kq, k\, k-i and 7t-i), observing Kt-\ =
Kt-\ +r]t in period t is informationally-equivalent to observing the variable yt defined in (18). But
now note that
Vt = 0+ 7— r Vt,
which is simply a Gaussian signal with precision 7ft = 7
2
_j (k\ + K2) o~~t . It follows that all private
signals can be combined in the sufficient statistic Xi
t
t, while all public signals can be combined
in the sufficient statistics Yt . Condition (17) then states that these statistics are simply weighted
averages of all the available signals, with the weights dictated by the respective precisions of these
signals, while condition (19) states that the precisions of these statistics are simply the sums of the
precisions of the component signals.
The key property to notice is that the precision of information available in one period de-
pends on the strategy followed in previous periods. In particular, for all t, 7Tj and thereby nf is
increasing in 7t_i.
23 This is because the informative content of the signals of aggregate activity
is higher the more sensitive the strategies of the agents to their private information. 24 This is an
important informational externality that the equilibrium fails to internalize in the absence of policy
intervention.
23When 9 changes over time, the period-t precision of information regarding the period-t fundamental need be
monotonic over time; but it remains an increasing function of the sensitivities of past strategies to private information.
24A similar property typically holds in rational-expectation-equilibria models: the information contained in the
price increases with the sensitivity of individual asset demands to private information.
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6.3 Efficiency and policy
We now turn to the policy implications of the aforementioned informational externality by charac-
terizing the strategy that maximizes ex-ante utility taking into account this externality. However,
unlike the cases of exogenous information examined in the previous section, we now restrict at-
tention to strategies that are linear in the available private signals. Without this restriction, the
endogenous signals are no longer Gaussian and the analysis becomes intractable.
Suppose, for a moment, that the government fails to recognize that the strategy the agents
follow in period t affects the information available in subsequent periods. Suppose further that the
period-i private and public information were summarized in sufficient statistics Xi^ and Vj with
respective precisions nf and 7rf , so that
E^N =^ +^,
and let k* (6) = argmaxK V(k, k, 0,6) = k*q + (k* + k%)9 and a* = 1 — Wvoi/Wdi s = 1 — {V^k +
2Vfc/<- + VKKJKYkk + Vera)- Proposition 8 would then imply that the efficient strategy is given by
with
,
(l-«*)7Tf
1 (1-0*) 71? + 7^
Now suppose the government takes into account the endogeneity of the information. As long
as welfare in the subsequent periods is increasing in the precision of available information, it should
be desirable to adjust the current use of information so as to induce more learning in subsequent-
periods. Because more learning is achieved only by the aggregation of private information, this
suggests that the informational externality raises the sensitivity of efficient strategies to private
information. The following result verifies this intuition.
Proposition 11 The linear strategy that maximizes ex-ante utility is given by
Kt Kt) = k* (7£jfM + (1 - tT) Yt )
,
where
(l-a*)7i?
It
(1 - a*) 7T? + n? - P (1 - a*) (l - 7£x )
2
Trfyrf {^y 2 («J + k*) 2 a~ 2t+1
for all t < N, while 7^* = (1 — a*) itxn / [(1 — a*) ir
x
N + 7r^] . Xi t t and Yt are sufficient statistics for
all the private and public information about 6 available to agent i in period t, while irx and irf are
their respective precisions; they are obtained recursively using (17)-(19), replacing (7t,Ko> K i> K2)
with (7t**, Kq, Kj, K2)
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The key result here is that, holding constant the current precisions of private and public
information, the optimal weight on private information is higher than what it would have been had
information in the subsequent periods been exogenous:
**
<**)*?
7i > (l-a*)n? + nl
As anticipated, this follows directly from the internalization of the informational externality: by
raising the reliance on private information in one period, society achieves higher precision of infor-
mation and hence higher welfare in subsequent periods. 25
The following alternative representation of the optimal strategy helps translate the result here
in terms of the degree of complementarity that the policy must induce in equilibrium.
Proposition 12 Consider the efficient linear strategy and let {fi t ,$ t } i=1 be the associated infor-
mation structure. There exists a unique sequence {a£*}t=1 , with a^* < a* for all t < N and
a*^ = a* , such that the efficient strategy and the information structure jointly satisfy, for all t,
fc?(wt) = E[ k* {9) + a? (Kt (&) - k* (9t)) | ut ] (20)
for almost all ut € fit, with Kt(<f>t) = Jq k% (a/) d(f>t {ui') for all </>t e $ t .
As in the case without informational externalities, the weight a*
t
* in condition (20) summarizes
how much society would like the agents to factor their expectations of other agents' choices in their
own choices. Unlike the case without informational externalities, this weight now depends on the
information structure. Nevertheless, condition (20) remains a valid and insightful representation
of the optimal strategy: the result that a*[* < a* highlights that having the agents internalize the
informational externality is isomorphic to having them perceive a lower complementarity in their
actions than the one they should have perceived had information been exogenous. This in turn
guides policy analysis: the optimal linear strategy can be implemented with similar tax schemes
as in the benchmark model, but now the sensitivity T^k of the marginal tax to aggregate activity
must be higher than what it would have been with exogenous information.
Corollary 5 Informational externalities unambiguously contribute to a higher optimal sensitivity
of the marginal tax to aggregate activity.
This result is true irrespective of the specific payoff interdependencies and irrespective of
whether the equilibrium would have been efficient had information been exogenous. Moreover,
it easily extends to richer Gaussian information structures, with multiple private and public signals
25 Of course, this informational externality is absent in the very last period, which explains why the result does not
hold at t = N.
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of aggregate activity. It relies merely on two properties: (i) that a higher T^k induces more learning
by increasing the sensitivity of actions to private information; and (ii) that the social value of such
learning is positive because the optimal policy removes any inefficiencies in the use of information.
We further discuss the importance of this last point in the next section, where we study how
the policies we have identified affect the social value of information. Before turning to this issue,
however, we study the properties of optimal policy for a special case of interest: economies in which
inefficiency emerges only because of informational externalities.
This special case is motivated by the following observations. In certain settings (e.g., Walrasian
economies with no externalities), one may expect that competitive market forces achieve a perfect,
or near perfect, coincidence of private and social payoffs. Although such a coincidence may fail to
obtain in the absence of complete markets or in the presence of other market distortions, this case
still represents an important benchmark. At the same time, when information is dispersed, one may
expect that individual market participants fail to internalize how their choices affect the quality of
information contained in financial prices, macroeconomic indicators, and other endogenous signals
of the underlying fundamentals. In our set up, these settings correspond to economies in which
information is endogenous but where (k,ch) = (k*,cy*), so that private and social payoffs coincide
and inefficiency emerges only because of informational externalities.
The following is then an immediate implication of Corollary 5 along with the fact that, for
these economies, the optimal tax would be zero had information been exogenous.
Corollary 6 In economies in which inefficiency emerges only because of informational externali-
ties,, the optimal policy is such that T^k > 0.
This result may be relevant for understanding optimal policy over the business cycle. Consider
standard real-business-cycle models in which all firms and households share the same information
regarding aggregate productivity and taste shocks. The assumption of frictionless competitive
markets along with the absence of direct payoff externalities then guarantees that the equilibrium
business cycle is efficient. Now consider a small, yet realistic, modification of these models: let
information be dispersed and only imperfectly aggregated through prices and macro data. This
modification is likely to render the business cycle inefficient as agents fail to internalize how their
choices affect the information of others. Our results then suggest the following policy remedy:
by having marginal taxes increase with realized aggregate macroeconomic activity and decrease
with realized productivity, the government can improve the information contained in prices and
macro data, and can thereby reduce the non-fundamental component of the business cycle (i.e., the
fluctuations that are driven by noise in information regarding aggregate demand and productivity
conditions).
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7 Implications for the social value of information
Throughout our analysis, we have ruled out policies that convey information to the agents. However,
if the government possess information that is not directly available to the market (e.g. macroeco-
nomic data collected by government agencies such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the US Census
Bureau, or the Federal Reserve Banks), then it is important to understand whether it is socially
desirable to communicate such information to the market. A positive answer is not obvious.
Indeed, as long the equilibrium use of information is inefficient, an increase in the precision of
available information can have a detrimental effect on welfare. For example, if a > a*, agents may
overreact to any additional public information, exacerbating the already excessive non-fundamental
volatility. However, this can not be the case if the equilibrium use of information is efficient. This
is because the equilibrium strategy then coincides with the solution to a planning problem where
the planner directly controls how agents use their available information. An argument analogous
to Blackwell's theorem then guarantees that additional information can not reduce welfare. 26 The
following result is then a direct implication of these observations.
Corollary 7 In general, more precise information can reduce welfare. However, policies that re-
store efficiency iji the decentralized use of information also guarantee a positive social value for any
information disseminated by policy makers or other institutions.
In an influential paper, Morris and Shin (2002) used an elegant example to illustrate the
possibility that more precise public information can reduce welfare: a "beauty-contest" game, where
the strategic complementarity perceived by the agents is not warranted from a social perspective,
causing overreaction to public news. 27 This example has lead to a renewed debate on the merits
of transparency in central bank communications. 28 Whereas this question has been studied largely
in isolation from other aspects of policy making, our results indicate that a central bank's optimal
communication policy is far from orthogonal to the corrective roles of monetary and fiscal policies. 29
In a related but different line of reasoning, Amador and Weill (2007) argue that, by crowding
out private information, an increase in the precision of exogenous public information can reduce
the precision of the endogenous information contained in prices and other indicators of economic
26 For further details on how the welfare effect of additional information depends on the inefficiencies, if any, of the
equilibrium use of information, see Angeletos and Pavan (2007).
27Their example is nested in our baseline static framework with k = k* and a > a"; it is an economy where
inefficiency emerges only under dispersed information and manifests itself in excessive non-fundamental volatility.
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See, for example, Amato and Shin (2006), Angeletos and Pavan (2004, 2007), Baeriswyl and Conrand (2007),
Heinemann and Conrand (2006), Hellwig (2005), Morris and Shin (2002, 2005), Roca (2006), Svensson (2005),
Woodford (2005).
29An exception is Baeriswyl and Conrand (2007), which focuses on the signaling effects of monetary policy.
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activity and can thereby slow down social learning. 30 A similar theme is explored in Morris and
Shin (2005) and Amato and Shin (2006). Our results imply that the government can improve the
informational content of prices, can raise the speed of social learning, and can guarantee that any
public information it disseminates is welfare improving, once it sets in place policies that correct
the underlying inefficiency in the decentralized use of information.
8 Concluding remarks
Information about commonly-relevant fundamentals—such aggregate productivity and demand
conditions or the profitability of available technologies—is highly dispersed in society, is only im-
perfectly aggregated through markets, and can not be centralized by the government or any other
institution. As first emphasized by Hayek (1945), this means that society has to rely on decentral-
ized market mechanisms for an effective utilization of such information. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the government should not interfere with the decentralized use of informa-
tion: to the extent that private and social incentives in the use of such information do not coincide,
the equilibrium's response to certain sources of information may be inefficient, leading to excessive
non-fundamental volatility, excessive dispersion, or suboptimal social learning.
The key contribution of the paper was to identify policies that correct such inefficiencies: by
appropriately designing the contingency of marginal taxes on aggregate activity, along with other
properties of the tax system, the government can manipulate the incentives the agents face in using
different sources of information and can thereby improve welfare even if it cannot itself collect and
disseminate information or create new channels through which information is aggregated in society.
We established this result within an abstract but flexible framework in order to highlight the
potential generality of the insight. Of course, the details of the optimal contingency will depend on
the details of the application under examination. If the key inefficiencies are overreaction to public
news and excessive non-fundamental volatility, as it is often argued to be the case for financial
markets, then marginal taxes must increase with aggregate activity. The same is true if the key
inefficiency is the failure of markets to internalize the endogeneity of the information contained
in financial prices and macroeconomic data. In both cases, it is desirable to provide incentives
so that agents rely less on common sources of information; this can be achieved by introducing
a positive contingency of marginal taxes on signals of aggregate activity. The opposite policy
prescription applies to markets exhibiting overreaction to private information and excessive cross-
sectional dispersion. Nevertheless, the key principle—the optimality of marginal taxes contingent
on aggregate economic conditions—remains valid for any economy featuring dispersed information
regarding commonly-relevant fundamentals.
30Amador and Weill (2007) extend Vives (1993, 1997) to situations with both private and public learning. Both
models are nested in our analysis of Section 6 as special cases that rule out payoff externalities.
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Examining the practical, political-economy, considerations that might complicate the introduc-
tion of explicit aggregate contingencies in the tax code is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it is important to note that there are various direct and indirect ways through which
such contingencies can obtain in practice. For example, the government could first collect non-
contingent taxes and subsequently make rebates whose magnitude depends on realized aggregate
activity. Alternatively, the tax code could be revised over time on the basis of past macroeconomic
performance. To the extent that such rebates or revisions are systematic, they can have similar
incentive effects as the type of contingencies envisioned in this paper.
Moreover, the contingency of monetary policy to macroeconomic performance could serve a
similar role: how firms use different sources of information when making their pricing and produc-
tion choices depends on how they anticipate monetary policy to respond to the information about
aggregate employment, output and prices that arrives over time. For example, to the extent that
higher interest rates have similar incentive effects as higher taxes, the Central Bank can use the
contingency of its interest-rate policy on aggregate economic conditions, not only for the familiar
stabilization purposes, but also to improve the information that is contained in prices and macro
data. Further exploring how the policy objectives we have studied in this paper filter in the optimal
design of monetary policy is a fruitful direction for future research.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the result in three steps. Steps 1 and 2 characterize,
respectively, the complete-information equilibrium and the first-best allocation. Step 3 extends the
results to the case of incomplete but common information.
Step 1. Consider the complete-information equilibrium. Because payoffs are concave in k, for
any given K the optimal action for agent i is pinned down by the first-order condition Uk (ki, K,9{) =
0. Because U is quadratic in (k,K,9), the first-order condition is equivalent to
Uk (0, 0, 0) + Ukk ki + UkKK + Uke 9i = 0. (21)
Aggregating across agents (i.e., integrating over 9i), we thus have that
Uk (0, 0, 0) + [Ukk + UkK] K + Uke9 = 0. (22)
Combining (21) with (22), and letting
C4 (0,0,0) Uke Uke ,,„*K
°--(ukk + ukKy M -=!w K2 ~-(ukk + ukK ) Ku (23)
gives the result.
Step 2. Next, consider the first-best allocation. A feasible allocation consists of a combination
of a strategy k : x H —* R and a system of budget-balanced transfers across agents. For any
given cross-sectional distribution of productivities h G H and any given strategy k : x H —* R,
let K{h) = J k {6; h) dh (9) and ak (h) = (J [k {9; h) - K{h)}
2 dh (6>)) 1/2 be the corresponding mean
and dispersion of activity in the cross section of the population. Next, let
w(k;h)= U{k{9;h),K{h),ak (h),9)dh(9) (24)
denote ex-ante utility behind the veil of ignorance (equivalently, welfare under an utilitarian aggre-
gator). Because of the quasi-linearity of payoffs in transfers, ex-ante utility depends only on the
strategy k. An allocation is thus efficient if and only if the strategy k : x H —> K maximizes
w(k;h). Because U is quadratic, and Ua (k,K,ak ,9) = Uaaak , we then have that
w = U(K,K,0,0) + \{Uau + Ukk)4 +
l
-Uoeo 2e +UBkU [k (9)9} dh (9) - K9
where for simplicity we dropped the dependence of k, K and ak on h. Then let
L = w - A ( I k{9)dh (6)-k\-ix[I \k[6) - K} 2 dh [9) - a\
denote the Lagrangian for this problem. Optimizing L with respect to K, a\ and k(9) we have that
Uke9 -X-2fi \k(9) -K\ =
Uk (K, K, 9) + UK [K, K, 9) -U9k9 + X =
- (Uaa + Ukk )+fi =
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Combining, we have that
Uk69 + Uk (K, K, §) + UK (K, K, §) - Ukg6 + {Uaa + Ukk ) [k{6) - K] = (25)
or equivalently
Uke6+ Uk (Q, 0, 0) + UK (0, 0, 0) + [UkK + 2UkK + UKK]K + UKB + {Uaa + Ukk ) [HO) - K(h)} (26)
Integrating over 6 we then have that
=
Uk (0,0,0) + UK (0,0,0) {Urn + Uke) g ^
Substituting (27) into (26), and letting
. _
Uk (0,0,0) + t/fc (0,0,0) ^ ~Uke + UK6 * m ,
"° "
-(C/fcfc + 2Cfc* + C/k/c) '
Kl
~ ~ (Ukk + Uaa) '
K2
~
-{Ukk + 2UkK + Ukk) ^ [ '
gives the result.
Step 3. Now suppose that information is incomplete but common. Since all information is
common, the aggregate activity K is also commonly known in equilibrium. The first-order condition
for agent i is thus given by
Uk (0, 0, 0) + Ukkh + UkKK + UkgE[0i\P] = 0,
where V denotes the commonly-available information set (whatever this is). Aggregating this across
agents, and noting that the cross-sectional average of E^T7] is simply E[#|P], we get
uk (o, o, o) + pkk + UkK) k + u^ne^v] = 0.
Note that the above two conditions are identical to conditions (21) and (22), except for the fact
that 0i and 6 have been replaced by E[5j|7? ] and Ef^lT3 ]. It is thus immediate that the equilibrium
action for agent i is given by
ki = E[K(6i,0)\P].
A similar argument implies that the efficient action is given by
ki =E[K*(0i ,§)\P],
which completes the proof of the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove the result in two steps. Step 1 proves that condition (4)
characterizes any equilibrium. Step 2 proves existence and uniqueness.
Step 1. Take any strategy k : Q. —> R and let K((j>) = J k (u) dip (to) . A best-response is a
strategy k' : Q —> K such that, for all u>, k' (u>) solves the first-order condition
E[Uk(k',K(<l>),e)\u] = 0. (29)
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Using the fact that Uk (k',K,9) = Uk (K,(9 , 9) , k{9 , 9) , 9) + Ukk (k' - k{9,9)) + UkK (K-k(O,0)),
where k stands for the complete-information equilibrium allocation and the fact that k solves
Uk (K{9,6),K{6,6),6) = for all (9,9) , (29) reduces to
E[Ukk (k' - k(0, §)) + UkK (K {$) - k (8, $))\u] = 0,
or equivalently k'(u>) — E[k(9, 9) + a (K (<f>) — k(9,9)) | u>]. In equilibrium, k'(u>) = k(u) for all ui,
which gives (4).
Step 2. What remains to prove is that the equilibrium exists and is unique; this can be done
with the help of Proposition 3, which characterizes the efficient use of information. Let U denote
the class of payoff functions U that satisfy the properties specified in Section 2. An economy is
given by e = (U, Q,Q,F) . By comparing conditions (4) and (10), it is immediate that the set of
equilibrium strategies for the economy e = (U, 0, fi, F) coincides with the set of efficient strategies
for an economy e' = (f/',0,fi,F) such that the k* and a* corresponding to e' coincide with the
k and a corresponding to e. Moreover, U' £ U as long as U G U. As shown in Proposition 3, the
efficient strategy for any economy e' with U' £ U exists and is uniquely determined for all but a
measure-zero set of uj. It follows that an equilibrium for the economy e exists and is unique.
Proof of Corollary 1. From (4), we have that aggregate investment satisfies
K{4>)= I"e[ k{9 ,9) - ok(9 ,8) \ <i> ]d<p(u)) + a f E[ K (<j>) | u]d4>{u).
Using the fact that Ki = k,2(1 — a)/a,
k(9,9) - olk%6) = (1 - a)K + ki6.
It follows that
K{(f>) = (1 -^Ko + KiE 1 +a [e[K(<P)
I
u]d<j){u)
and hence that
E[K((j>) \u] = {l-a)K + KiE[E 1 \(j] + aE[ fE[K{^>) | J ]d(f>(oj') \ u ].
Iterating and then substituting into (4) gives
oo
k(ij) = E{K + K 1 9 + K 1 J2 anE
n
I
w], (30)
n=l
which together with K\ — K2(l — a) /a and the definition of 9 gives the result.
Proof of Lemma 1. A Taylor expansion of U(k, K, ak ,9) around (k, K, ak ,9) gives
En - E[UCk,K,ak ,9) + Uk Ck,K,ak ,9)(k-k) + UK (k,k,ak,9)(K-K) + Ua (k,K,ak ,9)(ak -ak )
+\ukk {k - kf + ~UKK (K - K) 2 + l-Uaa {ak - bkf + UkK (k - K)(K - K) ].
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By the law of iterated expectations,
E[K\h] =E[E[K\e,h]\h] = E[E[E[k(u)\<f>]\e , h]\h]
= E[E[k(u)\6,h]\h] =E[k(6\h)\h] = K(h).
It follows that E[K] = E[K] and that
E[Uk (k, K, ak ,9)(k - k)] = E[UK (k, K,
a
k ,6)(K - K)} = 0.
Furthermore, because U is linear in o\, Ua (k,K,ak ,8) = Uaaak (ak ~ <?>) It follows that
Ua {k,K,ak ,9)(ak - ak ) + -Uaa (ak - ak ) 2 = -Uaa [ak - ak ]
Next, note that
{k - k) 2 = [(k -K)- (k - K)} 2 + (K- K) 2 + 2{K - K)\{k -K)-(k- K)}.
Because E[k] = E[K] = E[k] = E[K] and because {K - K) is orthogonal to \{k -K)-(k- K)}, we
then have that
E[(fc - k) 2 } = Var[(fc -K)- (k - K)} + Vai[K - K).
Finally, note that,
E[(fc - K){K - K)\ = E[(K - k) 2 } + E[(k - K)(K - K)\ = E[[K - K) 2 }
because (k — K) is orthogonal to [K — k).
Combining all the above results, we thus have that
Eu = E[U(k, K,
a
k ,6)} +
l
-Uaa [a2k - a2k] + ^UkkVac[{k - K) - (k - K)]
+
l
-UkkVzx[K -K}+ 1-UkkVm{K -K) + UkKV&r(K - K).
Using the fact that
Var[(fc -K)- (k - K)] = Var[fc - K] - Var[& - K] = a\ - b\
and rearranging, then gives the expression in (8).
Proof of Proposition 3. A strategy is efficient if and only if it maximizes
Eu= U(k(u),K(cj>),ak (cP),6)df(cj,6)dnf),
Jf Jn,e
with K(<f>) = J^ k(u)d(f> (lo) and <yk ((j)) = [Jn [k(uj) — K((f>)]
2
d(fi (to)] with (f> denoting the marginal
distribution over D, generated by /. The strict concavity and the quadratic specification of U ensures
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that a solution to this problem exists and is unique for almost all u>. Let G (<f>) denote the marginal
distribution of and Z (6\(j>) denote the distribution of 9 conditional on <j), as implied by their joint
distribution J- '. The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as
A = UIq In U(k(u), K(cj>), uk {<l>),e)d<t>{u)dZ{d\(j>)dG{<j>)
+ /4 \(<f>) [K(4>) - Jn k(u>)d<j> (u)] dG(<f>)
+ U M) HM ~ fniH") ~ K(<t>)M (w)] dG(cf>)
Therefore, the first order conditions with respect to K(4>}, ak ((j>), and k(u>), which are necessary
and sufficient for optimality, are given by the following:
Je In UK {k{u), K(<j>), 8)d$ (w) dZ{6\<t>) + A(0) =
for almost all
<f>
IQ Jn Ua (k(u), K(4>),ak (cP),6)d4> (_j) dZ{9\4>) + 2r1 {4>)ak {4>) =
for almost all
<f)
(31)
(32)
(33)
/9x, [Uk (k(u>),K(<l>),0) - X(4>) - 2r,mk (w) - K(</>))]dP(0,<l>\Lj) =
for almost all u
where P(9, cf>\ui) denotes the cumulative distribution function of (9, (j>) conditional on ui.
Using the facts that Ujc(k,K,6) is linear in its arguments, that K{<j>) = Jq k (u>) d<f> (u>) , and
that Ua (k,K,ak ,9) = Uaacrk , conditions (31) and (32) reduce to
H4>) = - / UK (K(<j>),K(<f)),8)dZ(e\4>) = -UK (K (<f>), K(4>), 6)
Je
7]{(p) = -\Uaa .
Substituting the above into (33), we conclude that the strategy k : Q —> K is efficient if and only if
it satisfies the following condition for almost all us £ fi :
E[ Uk (k, K, 6) + UK (K, K, 9) + Uaa [k -K]\u] = (34)
where, for simplicity, we have dropped the dependence of fc on w and of K on
<f>.
Because both
Uk{k,K,8) and UK(k,K,9) are linear, condition (34) can be rewritten as
E[ Uk {K*{6, e),K*(9, 9), 9) + Ukk (k - k*(9, §)) + UkK (K - k*(S, 9)) + Uke (9 - 9)
_____ (35)
+UK (K*(9,6),K*(9,9),9) + (UkK + UKK)-(K-K*(9,9)) + Ucra (k-K)\u>} = 0.
Now note that, when all agents follow the first-best allocation, then in each state aggregate invest-
ment is given by K = k*(8,8). Replacing k*(9,6~) and k*(9,8) into condition (25) in the proof of
Proposition 1, we thus have that the first best strategy solves
Uk (K^9j),K*(9,9),9) + UK (K%9j),K%l9),9) + Uke (9-9) + (Uaa + Ukk )[K*(9,9)-K*(9,8)} =0
(36)
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Substituting (36) into (35) and rearranging gives (10).
Proof of Corollary 2. Part (i) follows from Propositions (2) and (3): for any "non-
degenerate" information structure T, given n = k* , the unique solution to (4) coincides with the
unique solution to (10) if and only if a = a*. Next, consider parts (ii)„ and (hi). When information
is Gaussian and shocks are perfectly correlated
k = n + (ki + k2 ) [ifp fj, + 7j,y + 7iz]
,
K = K + (rti + K2 ) bVM + (ly + 7x)0 + 7y£] ,
k = K = k + («i + k2 ) [7M/i + (7y + 7X ) 0]
.
It follows that
vol = [(kj + k2 ) 7y ]
2
0^ and dis = [(ki + k,2 ) -yx }
2
<j\
The results then follow directly from (6) and (12).
Proof of Proposition 4. Given any policy T 6 T, let
U (k, K, ak , 9, 6) = U (k, K,
a
k ,8) - T(k, K, ak , 6)
denote an agent's payoff, net of taxes.
Now let k : x H —> R denote the complete-information equilibrium strategy when pay-
offs are given by U. Because U is concave in k, k(9;h) must solve the first-order condition
Uk (k(9;h),K(h),6,6) = 0, with K{h) = Jk{9';h)dh{9'). Because U is quadratic in (it, K, 9,9),
the first-order condition can be rewritten as
Uk (0, 0, 0, 0) + Ukk k (9; h) + UkKK (h) + Uke8 + UkS8 = 0.
Integrating over 9, we then have that
(37)
154(0,0,0,0) + Ukk + UkK K(h) + Uke + Uk -e = 0.
Combining (37) with (38) then gives k (9; h) — k(9, 9) = Rq + R\9 + k2 9 with
Uk {0,0,0,0) Uk (0,0,0) -Tk (0,0,0)
K =
«i
Ukk + ^fetf ~Ukk
- UkK + Tfcfc + TkK
Uke
K-2
Uke
-Ukk -Ukk + Tkk
Uke + UkS
- Ukk + UkK
Ki =
Uke - T,ke
-Ukk ~ UkK + Tkk + 7)
- K\
kK
(38)
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Using (23) the coefficients (ko,Ri,K2) can then be conveniently rewritten as follows:
1
-
Q
- wk Tkk ~ wk TkK
«i = : T-^-^i (4°)
1 ~m Tkk
_
(l-q)(Kl+ «2 ) + ^-rfcg
1
~
a
~ urk Tkk ~ m2 kK
Normalizing Ukk — — 1 then gives the formulas in the proposition.
Next, consider the game under incomplete information. Take any strategy k : fl —> R and let
K{4>) —. J k (ui) d<i> (u>) . A best-response is a strategy k' : fi —> R such that, for all to, k' (uj) solves
the first-order condition
E[Uk (k', K(cf>), 6, 6) \uj} = 0. (42)
Using the fact that Uk {k' , K, 9, 9) = Uk {k{9, 9),k{9, 9), 9, 9) + Ukk (k' - k{9, §)) + UkK (K-k(9, §))
and the fact that h solves Uk (k(9,9),k{9,9),9,9) = for all (6,6) , (42) reduces to
k'{to) = E[k(e, 6) + a(K {<f>) -k(9,9)) \ u]
with
- = UkK_ = UkK ~ TkK =
a +ttTkK m
-Ukk -Ukk + Tkk l-jfcTkk
'
In equilibrium, k'(u>) = k(uj) for all u, which gives (13). That a solution to (13) exists and is unique
follows from the same arguments as in step 2 in the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Take any generic information structure J-. For the equilibrium
with policy to coincide with the efficient strategy, it is necessary and sufficient that
a = a*, Ko = Kq, ACi = K*, K2 = «2- (44 )
It thus suffices to prove that there exists a policy T* £ T that satisfies (44) and that this policy is
unique. This is easily shown from conditions (39)-(41) and (43). First, note that k\ — re| if and
only if
Tkk = Ukk{\-n l /K\) = -Uaa . (45)
Because Ukk + Uaa < this also guarantees that Ukk — Tkk < 0. Next, note that, given Tkk = —Uaa ,
a = a* if and only
TkK = -Ukk (a - a*) - Tkk a* = -Ukka + (Ukk + Uaa ) a* = Uau - UkK - UKK . (46)
That Tkk and Tk j< satisfy — $K^^K < 1 then follows from the fact that Wvoi = Ukk+2Uk^+UxK <
0. With (Tkk ,Tkx) thus determined, and with both Tk§ and Tk (0,0,0) being unconstrained, it is
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then immediate that there exist a unique Tk§ such that £2 — ^2 an<^ a unique Tk (0, 0, 0) such that
^0 = Kq\ these are given by
Tkg = Ukk (1 - a) [« + k*2 ) - («! + «a)] - (Tfe* + TfcK ) (kJ + «3) = -UKe , (47)
Tfc (0, 0, 0) - Ukk (1 - a) («S - «o) - {Tkk + TkK ) 4 = -UK (0, 0, 0) .
Finally, for T to balance the budget (state by state) it must be that T (K, K,0,6) =0 for all (K, 6)
and that Tkk + Taa — 0. Along with the other properties identified above, it is then easy to verify
that this is equivalent to imposing the following:
T(0, 0,0,0) = 7X0,0,0) = Tm =
TK (0,0,0) = -Tfc (0,0,0) = UK (0,0,0)
Tkk = -%TkK - Tkk = -Uaa + 2UkK + ZUkk
TK§ = ~Tk§ - UK8
Taa = -Tkk
This also implies that the policy T is unique. Finally, that TkK increases with a and decreases with
a* follows directly from (46) along with the facts that Ukk < and Wdi s = Ukk + Uaa < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. For the case of additive measurement error, the result follows
directly from (14) noting that the last three terms in (14) do not affect individual decisions. For
the case of multiplicative measurement error, let k\ = k\{\ + 77 + Vi), K = K(l + 77), a\ = a\(l + rj) 2
and 6 — 6(1 + c). A Taylor expansion of T(ki,K, ak ,6) around T(ki, K, <Jk ,6) then gives
E[T(ku K,
a
k ,6)\u)i} = E[T(ku K,
a
k , 6)+\Tkk (a2 + a2v ) k2^TkKG%hK^\TKKolK2^\taac^Gl\ Wi ]
Proposition 4 thus continues to hold with k and a redefined as follows:
Uk (0,0,0) -Tk (0,0,0)
K
«i
-Ukk - UkK + TkK (l + a2 ) + Tkk (1--+ cr2 + a 2 )
Uk6
-Ukk + Tkk (l + a2 + a2 )
-
=
UkB ~ Tkg
2
-Ukk -UkK + TkK (l + a 2)+Tkk (l + a2 + a2 ) '
UkK -TkK (l+a 2 )
a =
-Ukk +Tkk (l+a 2 + a2 )
By implication, Proposition 5 also continues to hold, although now the optimal tax contingencies
depend on a2 and a 2 , m
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Proof of Corollary 3. Prom (45), (46) and (47), we have that the restriction k = «;* implies
that
Tkk = 0, TkK = -Ukk {a-a*), and Tk§ = -TkK (Kl + k2 ) .
The tax system is thus linear in k, with a marginal tax rate given by
Tk (K, 9) = Tk (0, 0) + TkKK + Tk§9.
Next, recall that K = E[A"|/i] and hence e = K — K is orthogonal to any function of h, including
9 and K. It follows that Cov(Tk (K,9),e) = TkxVar(e), which is positive if and only if Tkx is
positive, which in turn is true if and only if a > a* . m
Proof of Corollary 4. Because <j> is common knowledge, the n-th order average expectation
En of 9 (which is measurable in <p) is also common knowledge and equal to E l , for all n. Moreover,
because
<f) is common knowledge and because 9 = E [9\h] — E [9\h, <f>] , we have that
E l = E\E[6\u]\<l>] = E\E[9\uj,<t>]\<f>] = E [9\<t>] = E [E [6\h,<f>] \<f>] =E[S\4>] ,
Combining these results, we have that
oo
§ = Y, ((1 - a)"""
1
) En = E [6\<£\ = E [S\u] .
n=\
From Corollary 1 it then follows that the unique equilibrium is given by
k (w) = E [k (9, 9) \u] ,
in which case a is irrelevant. Similar arguments imply that the efficient allocation is given by
k(uj) = E[K * (0,5) \u] ,
so that a* is also irrelevant. Along with the result in Proposition 4, we then have that the efficient
strategy can always be implemented with a tax scheme for which TkK = 0.
Proof of Propositions 7 and 8. These are direct extensions of Propositions 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 9. Start with t = 1. Because information is exogenous in the
first period, that the equilibrium strategy at t — 1 is unique and solves (15) follows directly from
Proposition 2. Now consider t = 2. The information structure is now endogenous but uniquely
determined by the unique equilibrium strategy for t = 1. That the equilibrium strategy at t = 2 is
unique and solves (15) thus follows again from Proposition 2. Repeating the same argument for all
t > 2 establishes the result.
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Proof of Proposition 10. Start with t = 1. In the first period, information is exogenous
with Wij = (xi
t
i,yi,Ai). Standard Gaussian updating then gives
E[e\uiA ] =^Xi
,
1 +^!Y1 , (48)
where Xu = xiA , wf = cr"2 , Yi =^ + ^fz/i + ^i and Trf = a^"2 + a"2 + a"?. Using
k(8) — Ko + (ki + «2)^, we then have that the unique solution to (15) is given by
h (wi,i) = ko + (asi + ac2 ) (7i*i,i + (1 - 7i ) *i)
.
(49)
with
7l ^[(l-aK]/[(l-aK + <].
To see this, start by guessing that the equilibrium strategy satisfies (49) for some coefficient 71.
Next, use this guess to compute aggregate activity as K\ = Ko + (k\ + K2) (71 # + (1 — 71) ii)'-
Finally, use the latter along with (15) and (48) to derive the equilibrium 71.
Next, consider t = 2. In the second period, 0^2 = u>i
t
i U (xi
<
2,y2,A2,Ki,a\). The endogenous
signal is given by
Kx = k + («i + «a) (71 ^ + (1 - 7i) *i) + V2
The information about # contained in K\ is thus the same as that contained in
*
Jy1 -«o-(^+^)(i- 71)y1
=
.
+
(«i + K2J71
where 772 = t/2/[(ki + K2)7i] is Gaussian noise with variance cr? 2 — °"n 2/ (K i + ^2) 7i The signal o\,
on the other hand, conveys no information about 8, because (49) implies that o\ = (k\ + K2) 7
2
o"
2
^
,
which is common knowledge. It follows that the period-2 public information about 8 can be summa-
rized in a sufficient statistic Yi such that the posterior about 8 conditional on (yi,Ai,Ki,ai,y2,A2)
is Gaussian with mean
V Cx^ ^l A 72 (*1+«2)X 22 .
^2 =
-4*i + -\y2 +
-ir^2 + y —yi
*2 4 ^2 *2
and precision ^ = n\ + o-"
2
, + &~ \ + 7
2
(«i + K2)
2
u~\- Similarly, the private information can be
summarized in the sufficient statistic Xj^ such that the posterior about 8 conditional on (2:;, 1,2^,2)
is Gaussian with mean
X-i.2 — — ^i,l H 5" xi,2
IT,
-2
and precision Trf == 7rf + o~x 2 . The unique solution to (15) is then given by
h (wi,2) = «o + («i + «2) (72^i,2 + (1 - 72) Y2 )
,
with 72 = [(1 - a) Trf] / [(1 - a) Trf + tt^] .
42
It is immediate that the construction of the equilibrium strategy for t — 2 applies also to any
t > 3 with the statistics X^t an Yt defined recursively as in the proposition. We conclude that the
unique equilibrium strategy is
ki,t (ui,t) = Ko + («i + «2) (ltXitt + (1 - It) Yt ) ,
with 7i = [(1 - a) Trf]J [(1 - a) itf + iryt ] . m
Proof of Proposition 11. We prove the result in two steps. Part (i) characterizes the efficient
linear strategy in the absence of payoff externalities; this helps isolate the role of informational
externalities. Part (ii) then extends the result to general payoff structures.
Part (i). Suppose V (k,K,a,6) does not depend on (K,a) and, without any further loss of
generality, let
V (k, K, a,0) = - (k - 6) 2 .
Let ht — {yi,A\,Ki,...,yt-\,At-i,Kt-i,yt,At} denote the public history in period t and suppose
agents follow a strategy k = {kt } =^1 such that
t
kt {Ui,t) = Pi ih) + Y^ Qt,rXi,r,
T=l
where Pt (ht) is a deterministic function of h t and QtiT are deterministic coefficients. It follows that
t
ki,t = Pt + ltO +
^2, Qt,r€i,T,
and hence Kt = Pt + 7t# + Vt+i, where Pt is a shortcut for Pt (ht) and 74 is defined as
t
It = ^2Qt,T -
T=l
*NNext consider welfare. Given any linear strategy, ex-ante utility is Eu = J2t=i wt< where
wt =E[v (khU At+1 )) = E[v (h,u 0)} - <i+1
and where
E[v(kht ,9)} = E
= E
E {(pt + itO + Y!T=1 QtMr)~ey ,ht
(Pt + 7te-ef-J2 ,QlAr
Now consider a strategy k = {kt}^ that is a variation of the initial strategy k = {kt}t=i
constructed as follows. First, pick an arbitrary t and let ki iS (u>i tS ) — ki tS (u>i iS ) for all s < t. Next, in
period t, pick an arbitrary function Pt and any coefficients Qt,T such that 5Zr=i Qt,r = 7*' an<^ ^
t
h(ui,t) - Pt (ht) + *}2Qt, T Xi,T-
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Finally, for all s > t, let
s
ks [Ui
t
s) = Ps [hs) + / y Qs,rxi,r,
r=l
where the functions'A are such that
Ps (...,/?*,...) - ps [...,kt -
P
t (ht ) + pt (ht
By construction, at any period s ^ t, the strategy k induces the same outcomes, and by
implication the same per-period welfare level wt, as the initial strategy k. It follows that a necessary
condition for the strategy k to be efficient is that, for all t and all ht,
(Pt ,(Qt,r)r=i) e argmax=E
Pt.Qt.r
-(Pt + lte-e)
2
-Y t^=1 QIA,t h t
s.t. YX=\ Q't.r = it
This in turn is the case if and only if, for all t and all ht
Pt(ht ) = (l- lt )E[6\h t } and Q t<T = 7t € 'T _ 2 Vr. (50)
Next note that, because Pt is public information, the observation in period t + 1 of Kt =
Kt+rjt = Pt+ JtO + rjt is informationally equivalent to the observation of a signal
yt+i = — - = 9 + fjt+ i (51)
It
where r)t+\ = TJt+i/lt iS Gaussian noise with precision &It+i ~ It^nt+v ^ follo"ws that, given any
linear strategy, the common posterior about 6 in period t is Gaussian with mean E [0\h t ] = Yt and
precision tt\, where Yt and 7if are defined recursively by
7Tf 71? 71? 71?
Ty [< O 2 2 2
n = <_! + a„ it + attit + 7j-i^,i >
with initial conditions Yi = iiq and ttj' = c^ 2 . Similarly, the private posteriors are Gaussian with
mean
E [6\uiit] = -^-^xi>t + -^n,
and precision 7Tt = 71"^ -f 71?, where
x -2
A"j, t = -^-Xht-i + -^-xiit and nf = *?_! + a-" 2 ,
with initial conditions X^i = i^i and 7rf = ov j
.
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Now note that
a" 2
r=l 2-fj=l ax,j
which together with (50) gives
We conclude that a linear strategy k maximizes ex-ante utility only if, for all t and all w^,
ki,t Kt) = (1 - 7;) it + Tfe-Xi,t (52)
for some coefficient 7( 6R.
To determine the optimal 7's, note that, when agents follow a strategy as in (52),
E[w(fci
,
t> «l)] =
-{^(7r?)-i + (l-r>i)
2 (7r?)-
1
}
and hence
Eu = WFB -^ /J*" 1 { 7i2 (tt?)- 1 + (1 - 7i ) 2 (vrf)- 1 } ,
where Wfb is the first-best level of welfare (the one obtained under complete information about
9). Because the evolution of nf does not depend on 74, the choice of the optimal linear strategy
reduces to the following problem:
'"^li/l^wr'+^-^wr 1 }
s.t. 7rf+1 =^ + A i + a-
2
7
2 V<
with initial condition 7^ = <t7 , where A4 = cr~t + a~ t is the exogenous change in the precision of
public information.
Consider the value functions L4 : R+ —> R+ defined by
L t (n?,n?) = mm ^ ^{ 7s2 «)- 1 + (l-7,) 2 ( 7rD- 1 }
{7.}."=, S=t l J
s.t. nys+1 = tt« + A s + a- 272 Vs>i
For all t < N, Lt (7rf,7rf) must satisfy
.
L, (7rf.Tr?) mm {7? (vrf)-
1
+ (1 - ltf (Trf)"
1
+ /?Lt+1 K+1)7r?+1 )}
s.t. 7rf+1 = 7rt
v + A t + ^72
and hence the optimal 74 is the solution to the following FOC:
1
.
,
;
-1
,
1^5^4+1^+!
,K)--(.-,)(.r+^^=».
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^From the envelope theorem,
-(l- 7f+1 ) 2 K+1 )-
't+
Finally, from the low of motion for irf
,
dLt+i
_
,,
0*1+1
.,.. 2
It follows that, for all i < N — 1, the optimal jt satisfies
7T
-v** = 11 >
rrf + vrf - fi (1 - T^) 2 Trfvrf ( +^1 )
" 2
a-
£
2
+1
'
"? + *?
Finally, for t = N, ^ = nff/ (nfj + ix
v
N ) , simply because this is the last period and hence there is
no more an informational externality.
Part (ii). Consider now the more general payoffs V and let
re* (9) = arg max V (re, re, 0, 6) = re*, + (kj + re*.)#
with («;*,,«*,«*,) as m (^S) replacing U with V. A similar argument as in part (i) ensures that the
efficient linear strategy must satisfy
h {uit ) = k*q + (kJ + re*,) (ytXit + (i - 7t) y4*;»
for some 74, with .Xji and Y* are the relevant sufficient statistics of available private and public
information. Ex ante utility is then given by
Eu = Wfb + £f=1^ {& + «5) {^f (7,)
2
(vrf)"
1
+^ (1 - 7,) 2 W)- 1 }
where WFB = ^^ /?t_1 V7 (re* (0) , 0,0) is the first-best level of welfare. Using the fact that
Waa < 0, Wkk < 0j and WKK/Waa = 1 — a*, we conclude that the optimal 7's must solve the
following problem:
mi£ £? ,^ K2 ("f ) _1 + (i - <**) (1 - it? KT 1 }
s.t. vrf+1 = Trf + A, + (re* + re*.)
2
a~
2
7i
2 V*
Letting Lj (Trf,^) denote the associated value function in period t, we have
L t (tt? .tt?) = min{ 72 (Trf)" 1 + (1 - a*) (1 - 7i )
2 KT* + ^+1 (*?+i,*l+i)}
s.t. 7rf+1 = ttJVj = Trf + A t + (re* + re*;)
2
a"
2
^
2
The FOC for 74 gives
7, «,- - (1 -Od- 7,) W)- +^^=0.
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The envelope condition for nf+1 gives
8L
d7Tt+i
= -(l-^)(l-7t+ifW+1 )"
while the law of motion for 7r +^1 gives
= 2 (kJ + k*2 )
2
°J+1 7t-
It follows that the optimal 7's satisfy
7
**
=
(l-<**)*f
"
tt? + (1 - a*) Trf - 0(1 - a*) (1 - t^) 2 Trftt? (tiJ^)" 2 (/cf + k*2 )2 a~ 2t+l
'
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12. Let {ft*}u=i be the coefficients that characterize the efficient
linear strategy as in Proposition 11 and let {7ff,7rJ'}f_1 be the corresponding precisions of private
and public information generated by the efficient linear strategy. The result then follows from
letting a£* be the unique solution to
(l-ar>f
(l-arw+Tr? 7i
In fact, it is then and only then the unique solution to (20) coincides with the strategy obtained in
Proposition 11.
Proof of Corollary 7. Consider the environments with both exogenous and endogenous
Gaussian signals studied in Section 6. The result follows directly from the proof of Proposition
12, where it is shown that, for all periods t, the present-value welfare losses L t obtained along
the efficient linear strategy are decreasing functions of irf and n^ , the precisions of private and
public information available in the beginning of period t. Putting aside informational externalities,
the result can also be established for non-Gaussian signals using a Blackwell-like argument for the
planner's problem that characterizes the efficient strategy.
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